Transcription
Caples Escaped Prescribed Pile BurnFacilitated Learning AnalysisPicture by the Prescribed Type 2 Burn Boss on October 9th, 2019, at 1800 “the night before declaration.”“It’s an incident we’re not implementing a planned prescribed fireproject, we are making daily initial attack plans to maintain aprescribed fire project.” RXB2(t)The FLA team wants to recognize that through all interviews conducted, there were no major safetyconcerns brought to the team’s attention throughout this entire incidentEldorado National Forest, Pacific Southwest Region (R5)October 2019
Caples FLANovember 2019Background on Project:The Caples Ecological Restoration Project was originally discussed around 2010 and was a project thathad a “lot of interest” and support from the local community. The area is located 30 miles east ofPlacerville California. The watershed is more than 20,000 acres in size and is primarily managed by theEldorado National Forest (ENF). It supplies drinking water to about 110,000 people and businesses andutilizes the El Dorado Irrigation District. The elevation ranges from approximately 5,800 feet in elevationto 10,080 feet at the highest peak. With this vast range in elevation, three significant vegetation typesexist: Sierran mixed conifer, red fir, and subalpine which is interlaced with meadows, lakes and barrenrock.The project is located in an Inventoried Roadless Area and is a recommended wilderness area. The areais also cherished by the community and provides high quality backcountry recreation. The ENF identifiedthe Caples Creek watershed as a priority watershed targeted for restoration activities. The three mainactions associated with the restoration of the watershed are the gradual reintroduction of fire,management of fire-adapted ecosystems and meadow restoration.Heavy fuel loading was a concern in the area where historic (pre 1900) fire return intervals were 10years in mixed conifer, 40 years in red fir and 130 years in subalpine forests. Due to active firesuppression, the area had not experienced any active fire since 1916.The Caples Ecological Restoration Project Decision Memo was signed in February of 2016 and approvedthe re-introductory of fire as an ecological process through prescribed burning on approximately 8,800acres using manual and aerial ignition methods. Multiple entries within a 15-year timeframe wasexpected in order to meet multiple resource objectives. Approximately 4,400 acres was approved asunderstory burning in the lower elevations. Burning within vegetative islands (separated by barren rock)was approved on approximately 4,200 acres in the higher elevations where red fire and subalpinevegetation types would be targeted.Background forImplementation:In 2016, local cooperators,stakeholders and someenvironmental groupssupported the application thatwas approved to receive athree-year grant of 472,000.It should be noted, that thesame groups helped pay forthe National EnvironmentalPolicy Act (NEPA)environmental preparation.The grant was given to the ElDorado Irrigation District toserve as the fiduciary agent forFigure 1: Caples Ecological Restoration Project area MapPage 2 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019the monies that the ENF would then submit for cost recovery reimbursement for work completed. Thisyear, 2019, was the last year of the grant and to date, the ENF had burned approximately 300 acres andspent around 80,000 of the funds. There had been serious discussions about getting extensions for thegrant, but nothing to date had been confirmed.The watershed (or project area), spans two districts, although in 2019, the Placerville Ranger District wasfurther ahead in implantation with no burn plans finalized on the adjoining district. The PlacervilleDistrict’s overall plan for implementation of the project was to “start at the top and work their waydown.” With the heavy fuel loads, the district had completed a 50-foot fuel break along most of theridge in preparation for the bigger burn blocks. Multiple pile burns (three underburns’) were completedprior to September 2019. The underburns were implemented beginning in November 2017 with the lastone being implemented for a couple hundred acres on June 30th, 2019. It should be noted that duringthat underburn, they had a slop over that required two Interagency Hotshot Crews (IHCs), and a coupleengines working late nights to line the slop over and multiple days to mop up. It was expressed to theFLA team that it was “a lot of work.”In depth discussions for the October burn began to take place September 23rd, 2019. Pre-burn planningoccurred between the IHC and local fire management leadership. It was expressed that the Caples pileburning was the “number one priority due to grant dollars.” On September 27th, 2019, resourcesplanning the prescribed burn raised concernswith local leadership regarding potential firespread once fuels began to dry out and statedthat “we will need to transition to a Type 2[prescribed fire organization] and box in unit C-1along the ridge top.” A plan between DFMO andthe IHC Superintendent began to occur wherethey discussed and agreed that they likely wouldneed to transition to a type 2 burn after pileswere ignited. With both in agreement, the planwas set in place to continue to pursue ignitingthe piles, knowing that they would likely getsome creep. Forest Leadership had beeninformed of the planned ignitions andmaintained their support of the project. Both theLow Complexity Prescribed Burn and ModerateComplexity Prescribed Burn plans had beenpreviously reviewed and approved for that year’spotential burn window. It was also discussedthat there was substantial, “three inches,” ofrain received in the month of September.Figure 1: The Caples Rx Pile Burn public notification flyer.Page 3 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019Monday September 30th – Day 0 - The Day Piles were ignitedOn the morning of September 30, 2019, Alpha Interagency Hotshot Crew (IHC) assembled at the CaplesCreek Trailhead to implement the Low Complexity (type 3) Placerville Districtwide Pile burn which wassimilar to a project the IHC had accomplished the previous year, although later in the year, with noissues. Twenty- five acres of piles were planned to be burned that Monday. The burn boss, who hadbeen identified three days prior, initiated the test fire at 0955. During the test fire, the burn boss, whowas also qualified as a Type 2 (moderate complexity) burn boss, noted that there were “snow flurriesand light rain.” The Alpha IHC Superintendent observed that it was “cold and there was snow on theground.” The Owens Camp RAWS, which was the closest weather station to the burn, recorded over 1”of precipitation over the past 14 days. The weather forecast discussion for the day stated “Coldtemperatures will continue today with periods of rain and snow showers. Dry weather and a warmingtrend are expected for the remainder of week” and that “afternoon West winds may increase later” inthe week. At 1016, the burn boss documented that the test fire was successful and ignition operationscontinued with resources burning piles located at the Caples Creek trailhead, along Hay Flat Trail andGovernment Meadow.As the burn progressed, personnel observed that older piles built in 2017, comprised mainly ofManzanita and fir, were not easily ignited. However, those that were built this year (2019) readilyburned, especially those along Hay Flat Trail as it was located on a South aspect. The IHC Superintendentrequested that the Burn Boss check with the DFMO to ensure “we are still all on the same page” inregard to the potential for creep. The burn boss relayed the information to the DFMO and included thatthe snow was melting quickly on the south aspect around the piles. The burn boss confirmed after theconversation that they were all “on the same page.”Figure 2: Picture of pile burn area on 9/30/19 prior to ignitions. Snow is still on the groundPage 4 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019At 1402, ignitions were completed, and the burn boss instructed the Alpha IHC to “chunk” the piles toincrease consumption. The IHC remained on scene until 1600 when they were released by the burnboss to return to their station. The crew noted there was no creep from the piles as they departed andthat everything had gone as planned.By 1800, the burn boss and IHC had returned to their station where discussions began regarding thenext day of pile burn operations. Per the burn boss, the plan was to have the IHC light the remainingpiles and patrol the next day. In addition, the burn boss would transition to another qualified Type 3Burn Boss (RXB3) from Alpha IHC. Both the crew and the DFMO still expected that they would havesome creep out there. The burn plan did allow for creep on “30% of the unit” and that if 30% or greatercreep occurred, the burn boss “may” transition the burn to a moderate complexity Type 2 burn. Theburn boss then informed the DFMO of the planned operations and all were in agreement.Tuesday October 1st – Day 1 after Piles were IgnitedThe operation on this day would follow what AlphaIHC considered the normal plan for a lowcomplexity burn operation. This included lining thepiles to prevent creep. When Alpha IHC arrived atthe project they found that, as expected, pileslocated in Hay Flat Trail had crept. The area thatthe creep had burned into, was steep and hard toaccess. It was also the area in burn unit C-1 (seefigure 5 below) that had been planned with localfire management for under burning in the nextphase of the project.During the day, firing operations continued to burnthe remaining 10 acres of piles. In addition tothese piles being lined, they were “chunked” andthe IHC remained on scene to ensure that thesenewly lit piles were secure. The burn boss andFigure 3: Picture of smoke from piles burning on 9/30/19the IHC superintendent then discussed optionsfor the next days’ operations and determinedthat continuing the indirect line constructed earlier in the year by a Type 2 crew along the C-1 Unitboundary would need to commence and that the crew would begin working on that task the next day.The DFMO asked that the IHC work their next day off to continue operations on the burn. In general,while the IHC crew had identified a lot more work ahead of them to regain the upper hand of thesituation, the DFMO and crew were still in an operations normal mode.Wednesday October 2nd – Day 2 after IgnitionAfter arrival on the project and to expedite line construction, the IHC Superintendent requested a Type2 initial attack (IA) crew to assist with the work. The request was filled with a 10 person Fuels crew.Shortly after ordering the additional crew, the IHC received an off forest resource order for a wildfire inColorado. With receipt of the resource order, priorities shifted for the Alpha IHC and discussionsfollowed with the Fuels crew when they arrived regarding command of the prescribed fire and actions toPage 5 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019be taken. The IHC informed the Fuels Crew that would be replacing them on the burn that Alpha IHCwould remain on the burn until the Fuels Crew’s burn boss “was comfortable” with the situation. Thecrews developed a plan to construct line along the ridge above the Hay Flat trail. The Fuels CrewAssistant Captain, who was the qualified RXB3, was then briefed by the outgoing burn boss beforeassuming command of the burn. As both crews initiated line construction, the IHC Superintendentasked that the incoming RXB3 “let him [IHC Superintendent] know when he [RXB3] is comfortable withthem taking off for assignment.”As the day progressed, the IHC felt that operationswere “normal.” The IHC Superintendent,accompanied by one of his IHC Captains, returned tothe Placerville District Office to brief Battalion Chief(BC) Zulu and BC X-Ray regarding the currentprescribed burn situation and containmentopportunities. They discussed three options: optionone, put out piles at the junction; option two, put outall piles on the burn; and option three, line Unit C1,burn it and mop it up. Option three was the AlphaIHC recommendation. Discussion then shifted tocontain the “creep” by implementing the ModerateComplexity (Type 2) Caples Burn Plan. Also, toidentify the burn unit preparation that would need tooccur prior to implementation. The IHCSuperintendent stressed that 2 additional 10 personFigure 4: Picture of smoke from piles burning on 10/1/19modules would need to be assigned to the burnalong with immediately ordering “a crew to continueeverything” and that if no crew was available, options would be limited. Both Battalion Chiefs felt thatthe plan needed to be reevaluated but felt that they would want to discuss options with the DFMO uponhis return from leave. Once the briefing ended both Battalion Chiefs were “good” with the Alpha IHCleaving for their assignment.As the District and Alpha IHC overhead briefed at the district office, the incoming burn boss, whoassumed command of the prescribed burn at 1400, released the IHC who then returned to quarters.Prior to leaving, Alpha IHC Superintendent calls the DFMO and says, “things look good.” In addition, theIHC Superintendent emphasized that another IHC needed to be ordered “ASAP.”Considering the advice provided by the IHC Superintendent to BC Zulu, BC Zulu placed an order for areplacement crew that day to the Forest Duty Officer (DO).Page 6 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019Thursday October 3rd – Day 3 after IgnitionThe DFMO returned to workPiles to be burnedfrom two days off on sick leave toand linedassess the situation and see theC1 Unit – to be underburned inarea that had “crept.” As thenext phase and had partial lineDFMO hiked the active burn toconstruction completed earliergain further situationalawareness, the Forest DOrequested that all availablePiles to be burned –resources respond to the CaplesPiles to burned –anticipated creepprescribed burn to assist with theanticipated creepoperations. After viewing theburn and discussing the situationwith the RXB3, the DFMOunderstood the complexity of theFigure 5: Map of planned 2019 Burning. Red circles are location of piles to beburn was increasing based onburned. Unit C1 (Green polygon) was location of currently approved underburn.multiple actions that wereoccurring, including the increased area of creep, line construction, potential firing operations along theridge, and the current pile burn. With the new assessment of the situation, the DFMO determined thatthe burn organization needed to transition to moderate complexity to implement the Type 2 Burn Plan.The DFMO decided that he would assume the role of RXB2 and BC Zulu would become the RXB2 trainee(RXB2t) in the new organization. Although BC Zulu accepted the assignment, he did not feel that he wasadequately familiar with the project. Transition of command on the burn occurred during the afternoonof October 3rd, at approximately 1530.During the evening of October 3rd, the resource order for the IHC crew was placed and filled with theBravo IHC to assist with the prescribed burn. The IHC was to report to the Caples prescribed burn onOctober 4th.Friday October 4th – Day 4 after piles were IgnitedWith limited resources available on forest to assist with the prescribed burn, two engines reported onOctober 4th. In addition, a Field Observer (FOBS) was also requested and during the day, mapped thearea that had crept at 30—40 acres. As resources engaged on the burn, the RXB2 and RXB2t met withthe Forest Fire Management Officer (FFMO) and the Forest Fuels Specialist to assess the situation andreview the fire modeling for the burn to determine the next course of action. During this meeting, theFFMO gave his “support” to burn down the ridge to Silver Fork Road. This expanded the plannedignition area, however the burn stayed within the existing unit boundary and project area.There was discussion about the potential for the prescribed fire ignition to not back through the brushfields based upon the reported 130% live fuel moistures in the brush. This resulted in writing anamendment to have aerial ignitions available as a tool for future operations. There was discussion ofadding an additional unit to the east end of the existing burn plan boundary to align with the originalproject NEPA boundary. The two components of the amendment were discussed with the ForestSupervisor and the District Ranger (DR), and agreement was reached to proceed. The amendment toPage 7 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019the existing burn plan went through the required policy steps, and was technically reviewed prior tosignature by the District Ranger (DR). The additional acres that were addressed in the burn planamendment included the lower halves of Unit A and B (see figure 6 below).While an official burn plan for these additional acres had not been completed to date, Fire Leadershiphad been discussing the overall larger plan since the NEPA originally was initiated and given thecircumstances if unit C1’s containment lines did not hold, they felt like they had a good opportunity toimplement the larger plan.Bravo IHC arrived on scene and was briefed regarding their assignment which was to fire along thepreviously constructed control line of unit “C1” located on the ridge.After the IHC’s assessment, it was decided that the burning needed“Good Progress Was Made.”to be completed from the high point of unit C1 back towards the trailfirst before proceeding towards the west. According to the burnboss “Good progress was made” that day.RXB2 reflected on the dayAs Bravo IHC and the burn bosses continued to discuss the current situation, they determined thatadditional line prep would be needed to adequately hold the line during firing operations. Once theyfelt comfortable to do so, they commenced firing while continuing to prep line ahead of the operation.As the shift continued, the IHC completed firing out along the control line towards the east of the unit,and scouted line to the west.That day, a meeting occurred at the Supervisors Office with Forest leadership staff that was present.During this meeting a possible wildfire declaration was briefly discussed and dismissed as this was “theabsolute last resort.” If we declared a wildfire “it would trigger an investigation.” The impression ofsome members of the Forest Leadership there, was that this burn was not a big deal and was “fullyunder control and in prescription.” In general, Forest Leadership was supportive of the plan.Figure 6: Map of 10/4/19 amended RXB2 units. See Figure 5 for original burn unitsPage 8 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019Saturday October 5th – Day 5 after piles were IgnitedOn this day, the first organized operational briefing for the Type 2 burn occurred with all resourcesonsite which included: (1) Type 2IA crew, Bravo IHC, (1) FOBS, (1) Dozer, (3) Type 3 engines, (1) FireEffects Monitor trainee (FEMOt), (1) RXB2, (1) RXB2t, (1) Firing Boss (FIRB), and (1) Holding Boss.Operational objectives for the day included implementing firing operations along the ridge within unitC1. The long-term strategy was to continue to bring the fire down the ridge past the C1 unit boundary toextend to the Silver Fork Road before predicted high winds occurred later that week.The Bravo IHC was put in charge of firing. The area that theywere about to burn had a previously completed fuel breakSaturday was “the bestthat had been cut, piled, and burned within the past year.prescribed burning that I haveAfter scouting the line, however, the IHC determined thatever done.”additional line prep and snagging needed to occur prior tofiring out the line. From Bravo IHC’s perspective the burn-firefighter“had minimal prep, minimal snagging and incomplete line.”They sent a module out ahead to prep the line for the burnout. The crew noticed a change in operational tempo and an increased emphasis on getting the C1 unitblacklined, however, this was dependent on the progress of the line prep and handline construction.During the day, the Bravo IHC Superintendent continued preparation for the pending resource order toRegion 8 for a “preposition” assignment with a reporting date of October 10. The IHC Superintendentnotified the RXB2 of the order. After the conversation, the RXB2 believed that Bravo IHC would remainassigned to the burn until October 8. Later that day, the IHC informs the RXB2 they will only be able tobe on the burn until the 7th. Bravo IHC was previously committed to the Region 8 assignment andexpected that the information about the resource order had been communicated prior to accepting theassignment.Page 9 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019Back on the fire, at one point during firing operations, the IHC felt that the burn had the potential tooutflank them, but this was a situation theywere accustomed to during firing operations onwildland fires and planned accordingly. As theday progressed, resources successfullycompleted and held firing operations along the“C1” ridge to the hand line on south side of C1to meet the day’s operational objective. Withthe completion, both Fire and Forest leadershipcontinued to be very supportive of the currentoperations.During the evening of October 5th atapproximately 2000, a wind event occurred andproduced sustained East winds of 12-15 mphwith gusts up to 20 mph.Sunday October 6th – Day 6 afterpiles were IgnitedThe increased winds from the previous evening,pushed the burn out from the previous day,Figure 7: Picture of smoke on 10/6/19. While drivingover the “C1” ridge blackline. It was discoveredback from days off, the Forest Supervisors witnessesby the RXB2 early that morning. Resourcescolumn and begins to get “indigestion.”arriving on the line about the same time as theRXB2 were surprised by the slop over as they were unaware of the forecasted winds from the previousevening. As resources engaged to contain the slop over, the RXB2 placed an order for three Type 2IAcrews or better in anticipation of the next wind event predicted in the Fire Weather Watch for October9th.After Bravo IHC had sized up the slop over, they requested a helicopter to assist with operations basedon information provided at briefing that a local initial attack helicopter may be available for use. Theplan to pick up the C1 Ridge slop over with the fuels crew, would go much faster with bucket supportdue to the amount of distance between resources. While a Type 1 helicopter order was placed it did notarrive that operational shift.Page 10 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019That day, the RXB2 and RXB2t discussed the possibility of a wildfire declaration. A general increase instress across the organization is palpable and recognized. In the conversation, the RXB2t discovers thatBravo IHC will not be there the following day to fill a pre-planned resource order. This was the secondIHC crew that had left the burnfor a higher priorityassignment, in less than 3 days.Another order was placed foran IHC which was filled withCharlie IHC. When the incomingIHC receives the order, theylook at the weather for thearea, and were surprised to seethat a Fire Weather Watch waspredicted. Charlie IHC hadheard that winter weather hadbeen experienced in the area ofthe prescribed fire days prior tothe project beginning. Thiscaused confusion on the crewabout what kind of assignmentthey were headed to.Figure 8: Picture on 10/6/19. At another overlook, the Forest Supervisorviews the burn and remembers thinking “this isn’t a pile burn.”Monday October 7th – Day 7 after piles were IgnitedUpon arriving at the office, the District Ranger (DR) promptlyreceived a face to face briefing by the DFMO. Prior to this“Saturday looked like aday, the DR had been away from the District due to a familyprescribed burn with no controlemergency. During this briefing, the DR gave his leader’slines, after that I wouldn’t haveintent and stated that “if we need to declare [a wildfire], I’mwanted to be the burn boss.”okay with it.” The Forest DO had also advised both the DR- firefighterand the DFMO that the RXB2 should have “a good plan inplace” if the prescribed burn were to be “declared awildfire.” District and Forest leadership emphasized the safety of our people was the number onepriority. Concerns about funding should be secondary and should not be a prominent factor in decisionmaking. However, even with that emphasis by leadership the DR remembered hearing the DFMO state“don’t worry, I know what our daily burn rate is.” Strategy and tactics on the burn to date had beeninfluenced by keeping under the budget they had for the grant.Later that morning, the District Ranger spoke with Forest Supervisor and the DFMO about a training thathe was scheduled to attend from October 8th – 10th. He inquired whether it was needed for him to stayat the District instead of attending the training with the current events happening. It was agreed that hispresence was not “necessary.” The DR asked them to alert him if the “status changes” and also let themknow that he would “immediately return” if needed.Page 11 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019Resource orders continued to be filled by:Charlie IHC, (2) Wildfire Use Modules (WFMs),and (3) T2IA Crews. The request for a Type 1helicopter was resubmitted. Back on theprescribed burn, Bravo IHC who was initiallyexpecting to hold their previous days firingoperations, was briefed to continue burningwith the Firing Boss position again assigned toBravo IHC. Although the Bravo IHC continuedto prep line ahead of their firing operations,they sensed that the overall operationaltempo of the burn had again increased andthe emphasis on completing the firingoperations became more critical.As new resources arrived on forest, includingCharlie IHC, they were briefed and sentdirectly to the Caples prescribed burn. CharlieIHC noted that the briefing felt more“suppression oriented” compared to theirprevious experiences at prescribed burnbriefings. Charlie IHC also felt that there was aFigure 9: Picture from helicopter flight on 10/7/19sense of “urgency” to complete the firingoperations. Once they arrived at the burn,Charlie IHC tied in with the Bravo IHC. As the incoming IHC engaged, they continued line prep and firingin a “hot hand-off” with the outgoing IHC. The helicopter requested the previous day was finally filledby a KMAX helicopter and was ready to fly by 1500.Later in the day, the RXB2, along with the Forest Supervisor, the District Ranger and FFMO, DFMO tookan aerial recon of the Caples prescribed burn. During the flight, the FFMO observed 12 – 15 foot flamelengths in the brush during the firing operations and that these observations were not congruent withthe reported fuel moistures for the area. They also observed that burning had progressed to the dozerline above the 10N30 Road.It was noted by the DFMO that even given all the information provided on the flight that he was“surprised” with the support he personally felt from the Forest Leadership. He also felt that because ofthis support he was able to more readily focus on managing the burn. After the flight, the FFMOinformed the Forest Supervisor that he felt that the current course of action being taken on theprescribed burn was their best option under the current conditions, but it was going to be a “coin toss”if we would achieve our goals. The FFMO also stated that he was supportive of the efforts.Tuesday October 8th – Day 8 after piles were IgnitedMurphy’s Law entered the scenario when Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) implemented a Public SafetyPower Shutoff (PSPS) due to high winds to prevent potential fire starts from powerlines. This wouldfurther complicate operations and communication.Page 12 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019Due to expanding costs of the prescribed burn, the RXB2 began to get concerned about funding theproject. The RXB2 expressed these concerns to the District and Forest Leadership, who continued toinsist that we would find the funding.With the accumulation of events up to this point, the RXB2 requested a Public Information Officer (PIO)to address any public information needs concerning the prescribed burn.The focus of operations this day was to secure the eastside of the fire with two Type 2IA crews. Inconversation, the RXB2 stated we “have to get through the wind event and tie in to Silver Fork Road.” Itwas noted that there were competing priorities on the fire as crews were moved around. Charlie IHC feltthat the “command structure should have been broken into divisions” to increase span of control.Another amendment to the already amended burn plan was suggested this day to the Forest FuelsOfficer. The suggestion was for the burn plan to allow for additional acres on the adjoining RangerDistrict, however this amendment was not further developed.Wednesday October 9th – Day 9 after piles were IgnitedAfter the briefing, at which both theForest Supervisor and Deputy FFMOattended, burn personnel beganfiring operations at 1100. It wasagain noted that the ForestLeadership was showing a lot ofsupport to the personnel involved inthe burn and were actively engaged.High winds had been forecast but didnot meet the criteria for any type ofwarning or watch to be issued.Previous firing operations hadburned to a depth of approximately1,000 feet.In order to hold the burn during thenext wind event, Charlie IHCdeveloped plans and timeframes forFigure 10: Picture of tree torching on 10/9/19firing operations. In conclusion, theIHC felt that they were at least a daybehind where they felt comfortable in reaching their goals of holding the fire. They then briefed theRXB2 on their planned course of action. Charlie IHC felt that they needed to burn as if on a suppressionfire to be able to successfully hold the fire in the next wind event, however, it was apparent during thePage 13 of 16
Caples FLANovember 2019briefing that they still needed to meet“prescribed burn” objectives. Charlie IHCfound it to be “difficult” to burn as “fast” asthey wanted while still trying to meet burnobjectives. To help with this, the he
Caples FLA November 2019 . Page 2 of 16 . Background on Project: The Caples Ecological Restoration Project was originally discussed around 2010 and was a project that had a "lot of interest" and support from the local community. The area is located 30 miles east of Placerville California.
