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deliberations, none of which concerned the wording ofjury interrogatorynumbers seven or eight.At the hearing on the JNOV, plaintiff presented the same argument to thetrial court as she does on appeal. Specifically, plaintiff argues interrogatorynumber eight, irrespective of interrogatory number seven, asks the jury whatamount of damages will compensate Ms. Williams for injuries proximately causedby Walgreens only, not proximately caused by all parties. Accordingly, plaintiffargues the jury itself made the necessary fault reduction prior to rendering theaward and the 1,000,000.00 represents Walgreens' liability alone. At theconclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated:I think the trial was fair. I think the introduction of theevidence and the facts introduced to the jury, and particularly thearguments made by counsel were thoroughly examined andthoroughly argued. And I clearly understand where a jury couldapportion fault as it did in this case.I know that there was an argument with regard to the juryverdict form or the interrogatory form, and having reviewed that form,which is a form that the Court has consistently used and was approvedby all counsel, I do not believe in any way that it misinformed ormisled the jury into filling it out incorrectly. I believe that there is justification for the jury's verdict basedupon the testimony and the evidence that was introduced as [the jurywas] impressed with it.We initially note that under La. C.C.P. art. 1812, trial courts have widediscretion both in determining whether to use special interrogatories and in framingthe questions to be posed. Tramontin v. Glass, 95-744 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/30/96)668 So.2d 1252, 1258. Absent some abuse of that discretion, the appellate courtswill not set aside such determinations. Id. Further, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art1793, "[a] party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give aninstruction unless he objects thereto either before the jury retires to consider itsverdict or immediately after the jury retires, stating specifically the matter to which-7

he objects and the grounds of his objection." In order to preserve the right toappeal a trial court's failure to give a requested instruction or its giving of anerroneous instruction, a party must not only make a timely objection, but must statethe grounds of the objection. Willis v. Ochsner Clinic Foundation, 13-627(La.App. 5 Cir. 4/23/14) 140 So.3d 338,348-49. The rule also applies to juryinterrogatories. See Id. at 349 (where this Court prohibited review of defendant'sclaim on appeal that interrogatories were unclear or confusing where it failed tomake any such objection at trial).Plaintiff argues that she is not objecting to the verdict form, but instead tothe calculation of the trial court. However, the trial court's calculation was directlybased upon the verdict form to which plaintiff did not object.Next, a plain reading of interrogatory number seven clearly represents to thejury that any fault attributed to either Peggy Williams or Derrick Williams willreduce any amount of damages awarded to Peggy Williams in interrogatorynumber eight by that percentage, i.e. making it clear that the amount of damagesawarded by the jury in interrogatory number 8 must represent 100% of their awardsince it will be reduced by the percentages of fault assigned in interrogatorynumber seven. As stated, the trial court has wide discretion in determiningwhether to use special interrogatories and in framing the questions to be posed.Tramontin, supra at 1258. Moreover, the record is clear that both plaintiff anddefendant conferred regarding the interrogatories and agreed to its framing.Accordingly, we find no error in the construction of the interrogatories aspresented to the jury.While plaintiff argues a different view of the interrogatories, a JNOVshould be granted only when the evidence points so strongly in favor of themoving party that reasonable men could not reach different conclusions, not-8

merely when there is a preponderance of evidence for the mover. If there isevidence opposed to the motion which is of such quality and weight thatreasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reachdifferent conclusions, the motion should be denied. Davis, 774 So.2d at 89.Upon review of the law and the record before us, because we do not find thatthe evidence points so strongly in favor of plaintiff that reasonable men could notreach different conclusions as to the jury's intended award, we do not find that thetrial court erroneously denied the JNOV based upon any alleged error in thecalculation of the judgment. Accordingly, we affirm Walgreens' liability of 600,000.00.General DamagesLoss ofEnjoyment ofLifeIn plaintiffs second assignment of error, Ms. Williams asserts that the juryverdict awarding no damages for loss of enjoyment of life constitutes an abuse ofdiscretion. Therefore, plaintiff maintains that the trial court erroneously deniedplaintiffs JNOV on this basis.General damages are those which may not be fixed with pecuniaryexactitude; instead, they "involve mental or physical pain or suffering,inconvenience, the loss of intellectual gratification or physical enjoyment, or otherlosses oflife or life-style which cannot be definitely measured in monetary terms."Buckheister v.u.s. Environmental Services, LLC, 11-1148 (La.App. 5 Cir.5/31/12),97 So.3d 414,422; Duncan v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 00-66 (La.10/30/00), 773 So.2d 670; Keeth v. Dept. ofPub. Safety & Transp., 618 So.2d1154, 1160 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1993). Vast discretion is accorded the trier of fact infixing general damage awards. La. C.C. art. 2324.1; Hollenbeck v. OceaneeringInt., Inc., 96-0377 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/8/96); 685 So.2d 163, 172. This vast-9

discretion is such that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of generaldamages. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1261 (La. 1993),cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1059, 127 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994). Thus, therole of the appellate court in reviewing general damage awards is not to decidewhat it considers to be an appropriate award, but rather to review the exercise ofdiscretion by the trier of fact. Buckheister, supra at 422, citing Youn, supra at1260. It is only when the award is, in either direction, beyond that, which areasonable trier of fact could assess for the effects of the particular injury to theparticular plaintiff under the particular circumstances, that the appellate courtshould increase or reduce the award. Youn, supra at 1261.Therefore, the initial inquiry, in reviewing an award of general damages, iswhether the trier of fact abused its discretion in assessing the amount of damages.Conev.National Emergency Servo Inc., 99-0934 (La. 10/29/99), 747 So.2d 1085,1089; Reck V. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La. 1979). Only after a determination thatthe trier of fact has abused its "much discretion" is a resort to prior awardsappropriate and then only for the purpose of determining the highest or lowestpoint which is reasonably within that discretion. American Motorist InsuranceCompany v. American Rent-All, Inc., 579 So.2d 429 (La. 1991); Scott V. HospitalService District No.1 ofthe Parish ofSt. Charles, 496 So.2d 270 (La. 1986);Carollo v. Wilson, 353 So.2d 249 (La. 1977); Coco V. Winston Indus., Inc., 341So.2d 332 (La. 1976).Louisiana courts have held that La. C.C. art. 2315 allows a victim to becompensated for damages caused by the delictual act of another, includingdamages for one's loss of enjoyment oflife. Kelley v. General Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 14-180 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/23/14), --- So.3d ---, citing McGee v. A C andS, Inc., 05-1036 (La. 7/10/06), 933 So.2d 770, 774. Loss of enjoyment of life-10

refers to the detrimental alterations of a person's life or lifestyle or a person'sinability to participate in the activities or pleasures of life he enjoyed prior to theinjury. Willis v. Noble Drilling, Inc., 11-598 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/13/12), 105 So.3d828, 845, citing McGee, supra at 773. The Louisiana Supreme Court explainedthat "whether or not a plaintiff experiences a detrimental lifestyle change dependson both the nature and severity of the injury and the lifestyle of the plaintiff priorto the injury." Id., citing McGee at 775. Whether damages for loss of enjoymentof life are recoverable depends on the particular facts of the case and should be leftto the discretion of the fact finder on a case-by-case analysis. Id., citing McGee at779.At trial, testimony was consistent and uncontradicted that prior to plaintiff sinitial and subsequent strokes, Ms. Williams led a very active and independentlifestyle, which included steady employment, caring for her grandson after schooland on weekends, avidly traveling throughout the United States and socializingwith friends and family. Ms. Williams had a boyfriend and was the oldest of foursisters, who depicted Ms. Williams as the head of the family, the person everyoneturned to for assistance. Ms. Williams' psychologist, Dr. Beverly Howze, testifiedthat the 2006 stroke "brought her life to a complete halt, her life as she knew it,"and that Ms. Williams continues to suffer from major depressive disorder.Subsequent to the strokes, Ms. Williams was left dependent on her family andfriends, where often times her grandson cared for her rather than the opposite. Ms.Williams can no longer drive, can no longer travel on her own, and requiresassistance with day-to-day activities.We are mindful that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's or ajury's finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong.Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). However, considering the-11

testimony presented at trial, we find that the jury's finding of fact that Ms.Williams did not sustain a detrimental lifestyle change as a result of her strokes,found by the jury to be proximately caused by Walgreens' negligence, wasmanifestly erroneous. We therefore find that the jury's failure to award damagesfor loss of enjoyment of life constitutes an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, thetrial court erred in denying plaintiff s judgment notwithstanding the verdict on thisbasis. We now tum to similar cases to determine the lowest appropriate award forloss of enjoyment of life that would be within the jury's discretion. Duncan, 773So.2d at 683.In Cormier v. Republic Ins. Co., 11-632 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/18/12), 118 So.3d16, the third circuit awarded 50,000.00 for disability and loss of enjoyment of lifeto a plaintiff with a preexisting hearing problem whose independence and socialactivities were stunted after a cervical fusion causing her a 15% total bodyimpairment.In Levy v. Bayou Indus. Maintenance Services, Inc., 03-37 (La.App. 1 Cir.09/26/03),855 So.2d 968,980, writ denied sub nom., 03-3161 (La. 2/6/04), 865So.2d 724, and writ denied sub nom, 03-3200 (La. 2/6/04), 865 So.2d 727, the firstcircuit affirmed an award of 50,000.00 for loss of enjoyment of life citingplaintiff s inability to continue to roller skate, difficulty in flying in airplanes,difficulty in having (and enjoying) sexual relations with her husband, inability toaccomplish her goal of becoming a licensed professional counselor, and loss ofindependence and ability to maintain the high level of activity she enjoyed prior tothe accident.In Clement v. Citron, 13-63 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/19/13), 115 So.3d 1260, 1269 70, the third circuit awarded 30,000.00 for loss of enjoyment of life to a plaintiffwho sustained a cervical injury in a motor-vehicle accident based upon testimony-12

that plaintiff could no longer care for her mother, needed her son's help withhousehold chores, and could no longer enjoy dancing and running, two activitiesthat she loved, but did continue to make small trips if her friends did the driving.In Crisler v. Paige One, Inc., 42,563 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/9/08),974 So.2d 125,136, the second circuit affirmed an award of 40,000.00 for loss of enjoyment oflife, where plaintiff, who sustained serious injury to her knees, testified that priorto the accident, her hobbies included dancing and horseback riding, which she wasunable to perform after the accident, and where plaintiff s husband further testifiedthat plaintiff was no longer physically or sexually active, and while she could cookfrom time to time, it was hard on her.Considering the foregoing jurisprudence, we find that an award of 50,000.00 is the lowest award reasonably within the trial court's discretion forMs. Williams' loss of enjoyment oflife, and we amend the judgment accordingly.Special DamagesPlaintiff further asserts that the jury abused its discretion in failing to awardspecial damages for either past wages or future earning capacity. Plaintiff furthercontends that the jury's award for future medical expenses was inadequate. Aplaintiff is required to prove special damages by a preponderance of the evidence,and the findings of the trier of fact are subject to the manifest error standard ofreview. Smith v. Goetzman, 97-968 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98), 720 So.2d 39, 48.A.Past WagesTo recover for actual wage loss, a plaintiff must prove that she would havebeen earning wages but for the accident in question. Davis v. Foremost Dairies,45,835 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/16/11), 58 So.3d 977,988, citing Boyette v. UnitedServices Auto. Ass 'n, 00-1918 (La. 4/3/01), 783 So.2d 1276. In other words, it is-13

the plaintiff's burden to prove past lost earnings and the length of time missedfrom work due to the accident. Id.Awards for past lost wages are not susceptible to the great discretion giventhe factfinder, because lost income is subject to mathematical calculation. Bassettv. Toys "R" Us Delaware, Inc., 36,434 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/30/02),836 So.2d 465,writ denied, 03-0560 (La. 4/25/03), 842 So.2d 408. Past lost income can becomputed on an amount the plaintiff would in all probability have been earning atthe time of trial and damages for loss of past income are not necessarily limited toa multiplier of the amount earned at the time of injury. Id.At trial, Ms. Williams, Derrick Williams and Connie West, plaintiff's sister,consistently testified that plaintiff was steadily employed since a young age,enjoyed working, and intended to return to work post-Hurricane Katrina prior tothe stroke in June 2006. Plaintiff testified that most recently, prior to the hurricane,she was employed by the Orleans Parish School Board as a business managerearning approximately 26,000.00 per year. After the hurricane, however, theschool board laid off its employees in March 2006. Dr. Beverly Howze testifiedthat plaintiff recounted to her that she was considering a couple ofjob offers afterthe hurricane. Barney Hedgewood, licensed vocational rehabilitation counselorand life care planner, further corroborated the witnesses' testimony that Ms.Williams' was steadily employed. He recounted her employment upon graduatingfrom high school up until the stroke where she performed various accounting andclaims processing duties at Schwegmann's, Aetna Insurance Company, Winn Dixie, Bodeco Oil Company, Total Benefits Services, and Colonial InsuranceCompany prior to beginning employment with the school board. Mr. Hedgewoodopined that after the 2006 stroke, from a functional standpoint, Ms. Williams wasunemployable.-14

Dr. Randy Rice, expert in economics, testified as to the calculations of Ms.Williams' past wages. He testified that since June 10,2006, through that Mondayof trial, 6.64 years elapsed. Therefore multiplying Ms. Williams' undisputedsalary of 26,000.00 by the number of years elapsed since her injury, he calculateda past wage loss of 172,668.00.Based on the foregoing unrebutted testimony, we find plaintiff met herburden of proving that but for the accident in question, she would have continuedto earn wages. We therefore find that the jury was manifestly erroneous in findingotherwise and abused its discretion in failing to award plaintiff any damages forpast wages. Accordingly, we amend the judgment to award plaintiff 172,668.00in past wages.B.Future Loss ofEarning CapacityA plaintiff is further allowed to recover for loss of earnings and earningcapacity. Hobgood v. Aucoin, 574 So.2d 344, 345 (La. 1990). Earning capacity initself is not necessarily determined by actual loss; damages may be assessed for thedeprivation of what the injured plaintiff could have earned despite the fact that hemay never have seen fit to take advantage of that capacity. The theory is that theinjury has deprived the plaintiff of a capacity he would have been entitled to enjoyeven though he never profited from it monetarily. Folse v. Fakouri, 371 So.2d1120, 1124 (La. 1979).To obtain an award for future loss of wages and/or loss of earning capacity,a plaintiff must present medical evidence which indicates with reasonable certaintythat there exists a residual disability causally related to the accident. D'Ambrosiav. Lang, 07-298 (La.App. 5 Cir. 04/29/08), 985 So. 2d 800, 816, citing Aisole v.Dean, 574 So.2d 1248, 1252 (La. 1991).-15

Dr. Rice additionally testified to plaintiff's future loss of earning capacity.Dr. Rice testified that Ms. Williams' work life expectancy at the time of trial was5.10 years. Based upon her work life expectancy, her salary of 26,000.00 peryear, with a two-and-one-half percent cost of living increase, and potential forraises, Dr. Rice calculated Ms. Williams' future wage loss to be 130,650.00. Dr.Rice alternatively calculated Ms. Williams' future wage loss based upon the SocialSecurity retirement age of 66 or 6.82 years at the time of trial. Based upon theretirement age, Dr. Rice calculated Ms. Williams' future wage loss to be 173,986.00.Again, based upon our finding that Ms. Williams could have continued toearn wages but for her strokes, and the jury's finding of liability againstWalgreens, we find that the jury erroneously rejected the unrebutted testimony ofDr. Rice and abused its discretion in failing to award any damages for future lossof wages. We further find that based upon the consistent and unrebutted testimonythat Ms. Williams was steadily employed upon graduation from high schoolthrough the time of the accident, it is reasonable to conclude that she would havecontinued to work to retirement age. Accordingly, we amend the judgment toaward plaintiff 173,986.00 for future loss of earning capacity.C.Future Medical ExpensesPlaintiff additionally asserts that the jury's award of 600,000.00 for futuremedical expenses was inadequate where Mr. Hedgwood and Dr. Rice calculatedher future medical expenses to be 1,843,504.00 with placement into an assistedliving facility or 3,209,310.00 for at home care by a certified nursing assistant forher lifetime.Future medical expenses, as special damages, must be established with somedegree of certainty, and a plaintiff must demonstrate that such expenditures will,-16

more probably than not, be incurred as a result of the injury. D'Ambrosia, supra;citing Harvin v. ANPAC Louisiana Ins. Co., 06-204 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/06),944 So.2d 648, 655, writ denied, 06-2729 (La. 1/8/07), 948 So.2d 134. Theplaintiff bears the burden of proving entitlement to future medical expenses by apreponderance of the evidence. Id. Awards will not be made in the absence ofmedical testimony that they are indicated and setting out their probable cost. Id.Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact, even as to the evaluationof expert witness testimony. Green v. K-Mart Corp., 03-2495 (La. 5/25/04), 874So.2d 838, 843. A fact-finder may accept or reject the opinion expressed by anexpert, in whole or in part. Id.Upon review of the record, we do not find the jury's award of 600,000.00for future medical expenses to be an abuse of discretion. The largest source ofexpense provided for in plaintiff s life care plan surrounded attended care for Ms.Williams, whether by an assisted living facility or at home care. The jury in thismatter clearly did not believe that Ms. Williams required such extensive care.Although testimony from plaintiff s experts and treating psychologist testified thatMs. Williams requires 24-hour assistance, a review of plaintiff s own testimonyreveals that Ms. Williams, to a degree, can care for herself. Additionally, hertreating physician, Dr. Evita Currie, testified that as of 20 12, while her left-sidedparesthesia or tingling persisted, Ms. Williams reported no falls within the previousyear, feeling well, helping her grand

Derrick took her to Touro Infirmary on June 12, when it was discovered that she suffered a stroke. Her physician, Dr. Evita Currie, admitted Ms. Williams and attended to her care. Ms. Williams suffered a second and third stroke in 2007 and 2008, which Ms. Williams contends was caused by the initial stroke. Ms. Williams alleged to have sustained disabling injuries, including left-sided neural .