2013, Vol. 7, No. 1JOURNAL OFKNOWLEDGEAND BEST PRACTICESIN JUVENILE JUSTICE &PSYCHOLOGYPrairie View A&M UniversityCollege of Juvenile Justice & PsychologyTexas Juvenile Crime Prevention Centerii
2013 College of Juvenile Justice & Psychology, Texas Juvenile Crime Prevention Center, Prairie View A&M University.All rights reserved.ii
The College of Juvenile Justice and Psychology at Prairie View A&M University invites papers for publication in theJournal of Knowledge and Best Practices in Juvenile Justice & Psychology. The journal seeks relevant applicationresearch for the academic and practitioner communities of juvenile justice, psychology, and criminal justice. The editorial staff is soliciting both qualitative and quantitative articles on juvenile justice policy, delinquency prevention,treatment, and evaluation. The journal is published in hard copy and electronically. All articles submitted for reviewshould be sent electronically to the senior editor [email protected]. The articles should follow the APA style and betyped in 12 point font. All inquires and submissions should be directed to the senior editor.All submissions must be done electronically and manuscripts will be promptly refereed. Reviewing will be double-blind. In submitting manuscripts, authors acknowledge that no paper will be submitted to another journal duringthe review period.For publication in Journal of Knowledge and Best Practices in Juvenile Justice & Psychology: Manuscripts must follow the APA style (as outlined in the latest edition of Publication Manual of the AmericanPsychological Association.) The title of all papers should be centered and typed in caps on the first page with 12 point font. The title page must include the name, affiliation, title/academic rank, phone number, and the email address of theauthor(s). Submission of an electronic copy in MS Word as an attachment to co-editor: [email protected] maximum of 25pages with references and tables. The submission must be entirely original. All papers must be typed, double-spaced, on regular 8.5" x 11" paper, and fully justified with margins set to 1-inchtop, bottom, left, and right with 12 point font. Acknowledgment should be placed before references. Manuscripts that meet the above requirements will bepublished in the forthcoming volume of The Journal of Knowledge and Best Practices in Juvenile Justice &Psychology.Editor-in-ChiefTamara L. Brown, Ph.D.Dean, College of Juvenile Justice & PsychologyExecutive Director, Texas Juvenile Crime Prevention CenterPrairie View A&M UniversityPrairie View, TX 77446Phone: (936) 261-5205Senior EditorGbolahan S. Osho, Ph.D.Associate Professor, College of Juvenile Justice & PsychologyPrairie View A&M UniversityPrairie View, TX 77446Phone: (936) 261-5236iii
Journal of Knowledge and Best Practices in Juvenile Justice and PsychologyEditor-in-ChiefTamara L. Brown, Ph.D.Dean, College of Juvenile Justice & PsychologyExecutive Director, Texas Juvenile Crime Prevention CenterPrairie View A&M University, Prairie View, TexasSenior EditorsGbolahan S. Osho, Ph.D.Associate Professor, College of Juvenile Justice & PsychologyPrairie View A&M University, Prairie View, TexasEditorial Advisory BoardErin Espinosa, University of Texas, Austin, TexasDelores James-Brown, John Jay College, New York, New YorkIhekwoaba Onwudiwe, Texas Southern University, Houston, TexasSusan Ritter, University of Texas, Brownsville, TexasBarbara Scobey, Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services, Austin, TexasAlejandro del Carmen, University of Texas, Arlington, TexasKathryn Sellers, Kaplan University, Boca Raton, FloridaDonna M. Vandiver, Texas State University, San Marcos, TexasScott H. Belshaw, University of North Texas, Denton, TexasPublished by The College of Juvenile Justice and Psychology, Texas Juvenile Crime Prevention Center.Prairie View A&M University.iiii
Journal of Knowledge and Best Practices in Juvenile Justice and Psychology 2013 College of Juvenile Justice and Psychology, Texas Juvenile Crime Prevention Center at Prairie View A&M University2013, Vol. 7, No. 1, 45-54Assessing the Effectiveness of the Violence Free Zone in Milwaukee Public Schools: AResearch NoteByron R. JohnsonBaylor UniversityAndrew Gluck, Patricia Vazquez, and William WubbenhorstICF InternationalThe Violence-Free Zone (VFZ) is a youth mentoring program designed to address behaviorsthat result in truancies, suspensions, violent and nonviolent incidents, involvement in drugs andgangs, and poor academic performance in public middle and high schools. This study employeda quasi-experimental evaluation design, using data from VFZ students in Custer High School asthe treatment group and all students at non-VFZ schools in Milwaukee as the control groupfrom academic years 2006 to 2010. The purpose of the study is to assess the efficacy of theViolence Free Zone in providing mentoring services to high-risk, underserved youth withinMilwaukee Public Schools. We find preliminary evidence that the Violence Free Zone reducestruancy and suspensions of the target population as well as improving schools’ climate, moregenerally.Keywords: youth mentoring, truancy, violence prevention, youth violence, Violence-Free Zone(1) Those suffering from the problem must be involved inthe creation and implementation of the solution; (2) The principles of the market economy should be applied to the solution ofsocietal problems; and (3) Value-generating and faith-basedprograms and groups are uniquely qualified to address theproblems of poverty. At the core of CNE’s philosophy andapproach is a recognition that effective, community-based programs originate in those same communities, and not necessarily from ivory towers or subject matter experts who often havevery little practical or first-hand knowledge of these communities. The Violence-Free Zone (VFZ) initiative originated verymuch along these same lines, as community members workedclosely with school safety officers, parents and local police toimplement the program.The thinking and approach of the VFZ initiative, a violenceprevention and reduction program located within middle andhigh schools, was developed and formulated outside of thepublic school environment. Woodson first applied his knowledge on addressing youth violence and gang-related issues inJanuary of 1997 at Benning Terrace, a public housing development in Washington, DC, where youth violence had led tomore than 50 youth deaths within a short period and had culminated in the shooting death of a 12-year-old boy.Woodson and CNE helped to design a peace agreementbetween the warring youth factions, while helping to bring lifeskills, job training and job placement services for youth seeking to avoid a lifestyle typified by drug use and crime. Thepeace accord was possible because of CNE’s openness to recognize and learn from the skills and abilities of existing community organizations and leaders in addressing particularWe also know that in too many American schools there is alawlessness where there should be learning Make no mistake,this is a threat not to our classroom, but to America’s publicschool system and, indeed, to the strength and vitality of ournation.(President Bill Clinton, cited in Astor, Meyer, & Behre,1999, p. 4)BackgroundThe Center for Neighborhood Enterprise (CNE) coordinatesthe Violence-Free Zone (VFZ) initiative through local organizations in several U.S. cities. The Center for NeighborhoodEnterprise (CNE) was founded in 1981 by former civil rightsactivist and life-long community organizer Robert Woodson,Sr. The three founding principles established by Woodson togovern and direct CNE, which still serve as the guideposts forthe organization 27 years later, are:Byron R. Johnson, Baylor University; Andrew Gluck, PatriciaVazquez, and William Wubbenhorst, ICF International.We would like to acknowledge the assistance offered to us through thestaff at the Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, the Milwaukee PublicSchools Research Office, and the Runnin' Rebels. Support for this researchwas provided by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention(OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice (CFDA Number: 16.726). The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarilyreflect the opinions or policies of OJJDP.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Byron R.Johnson, Distinguished Professor of the Social Sciences; Director, Program on Prosocial Behavior, Baylor University, One Bear Place, 97236,Waco, TX 76798. Phone: 254-710-7555. E. -mail: [email protected]
46JOHNSON, GLUCK, VAZQUEZ, AND WUBBENHORSTcommunity problems. One of the key lessons that emergedfrom these efforts was an understanding of how much influence these violent youth leaders had on young people withinthese disadvantaged neighborhoods. Unfortunately, in BenningTerrace these youth leaders used their influence negatively tocontrol - and terrorize - the community. However, after CNE’sintervention, these same youth leaders instead used their influence to turn the community in a positive direction as theybecame involved as, for example, coaches of athletic teams,and as they sought to motivate younger kids to exhibit goodbehavior and complete their school work. Woodson and CNEsaw how youth leaders could be effective in influencingyounger peers and used this insight to create what would laterbecome a central piece of the VFZ Initiative.VFZ uses school-based mentors, called “youth advisors” tomodel and encourage positive behaviors among high-riskyouth. VFZ recruits youth advisors who can relate to youngpeople and who have come from circumstances and backgrounds similar to those of the students. The youth advisorsmonitor, counsel, and mediate on behalf of students within theVFZ program as well as assist with school-wide monitoring(i.e., walking the hallways, being there when students come toschool, etc.) and informal mentoring activities for the entireschool population. All of these efforts are done in coordinationwith school officials and representatives.How the Violence-Free Zone Initiative Works: The 10% RuleOne of the central challenges to public schools is the disruption of the educational environment and educational process(Gladden, 2002). Often a product of neighborhood rivalries organg-related conflicts occurring during school time, these disruptions cause instability within the school and create an environment that stifles rather than promotes positive learningexperiences. What Woodson and his colleagues learned fromtheir previous experiences working with gangs and violentyouth was the importance of identifying and reaching out to theleaders of these gangs. According to Kwame Johnson, formernational coordinator of the VFZ programs for CNE, thisdynamic had direct relevance for working within the highschool environment:If you have a high school of 1,000 or more kids, there are usuallyabout 10% of those kids responsible for most of the incidents anddisruptions occurring within the school. About 10% of thesekids, in turn, are the leaders that orchestrate much of thedisruptions, usually in the form of one gang acting out on anothergang. Much of the VFZ strategy boils down to first identifying,and second, trying to develop relationships with these 10 or soleaders. So, the 10% rule is really about the 10% of kids causingthe disruption at school, and then drilling down to the 10% ofthose that are really the driving force behind those conflicts. Byengaging and redirecting these leaders, we have seen significantreductions in incidents, particularly gang-related incidents, in theschools where the VFZ initiative is operating (Johnson andWubbenhorst, 2010, p. 5).The VFZ model entails recruiting and training Youth Advisors, who are generally mature young adults from the sameneighborhoods as the students in the schools they serve. TheseYouth Advisors command trust and respect because they havefaced and overcome the same challenges these youth are facing. They serve several roles, including: hall monitors, mentors, counselors, mediators, role models, and ‘peace-makers’when conflicts flare up in the school. The Youth Advisors alsoact as additional “sets of eyes” to ward off negative behaviorsas they also observe students’ behavior outside the building onthe school campus. Woodson (1998) describes the type of people sought out to serve this Youth Advisor role as ‘communityhealers,’ or ‘grassroots Josephs,’ the latter in reference to thebiblical character and the trials he endured, as well as his subsequent transformation as a leader in the service of Pharaohand helping Egypt during a time of famine. As Woodsonexplains:Grassroots Josephs may not have degrees and certifications ontheir walls, but they do have this - the powerful, uncontestabletestimonies of people whose lives have been salvaged throughtheir work. The undeniable fact that lives have been transformedthrough the work of modern-day Josephs must be appreciatedeven by observers who may be skeptical about their approach(Woodson, 1998, p. 76).Previous VFZ Evaluation EffortsLocal public school administrators with the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) have praised the initiative’s work, and theDepartment of Justice’s National Gang Center endorses theVFZ initiative as a promising program structure (OJJDP,2012). This evaluation builds on previous research on the Violence-Free Zone (VFZ) initiative in Milwaukee and Richmond.These earlier studies (Johnson and Wubbenhorst 2009; 2010a;2010b) examined the VFZ program by comparing school-widetrends for variables such as school-wide violent/non-violentincidents, suspensions, and school climate at the seven Milwaukee schools and one Richmond high school with VFZ programs. As of 2013, the VFZ Initiative is in nine of Milwaukee'sfourteen public high schools. The results of this research suggest the VFZ program was successful in mitigating violencewithin those schools. In contrast to the earlier research, whichexamined trends in the number of incidents, suspensions andGPA for high schools with the VFZ program, the current studyexamines the impact of the VFZ program specifically onyouths directly receiving mentoring services from the VFZ viaYouth Advisors at one of the VFZ high schools, Custer HighSchool. This research also draws from data provided by theMilwaukee Public Schools’ (MPS) research division, but witha primary focus on pre- and post- trends for those youthenrolled as mentees through VFZ, hereinafter referred to asVFZ caseload youth.The original evaluation indicated positive overall trends forstudents in the VFZ schools in comparison to those in MPShigh schools without VFZ, in areas such as, lower number ofoverall incidents, suspensions and improved student responseson school climate surveys. In contrast, the current study isdesigned to isolate the specific impact of VFZ on the studentsreceiving formal mentoring services, not only in terms of incidents and behaviors but also in terms of grade point average,truancy, and graduation rates. Future research will attempt to
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VIOLENCE FREE ZONEdetermine how much of the school-wide VFZ benefitsobserved in both studies are a result of the Youth Advisors formal mentoring activities and how much is attributable to thementors’ more generalized, school-wide efforts (e.g., greetingstudents, walking the hallways and cafeteria, etc.). Indeed,Youth Advisors make every effort to build positive and sustainable relationships with students and to avoid negatively labeling students, something research has identified as problematic(Greene, 2005; Kaplan and Johnson, 1991).Literature ReviewSchool-based violence is clearly not a new problem, but hascome to be more widely recognized as a significant problem asa result of the unprecedented press coverage surrounding theColumbine shootings in April of 1999. Tragedies like Columbine have caused educators to consider ways to address violence in our schools. School administrators obviouslyrecognize that disruptive behavior interferes with teaching. Thedeleterious consequences of school violence are many andinclude: weakening the ability of students to focus on academicpursuits; subverting the academic purposes of schooling by causingstudents to skip classes or to avoid school; precipitating such internal problems as depression andsocial anxiety causing fear among teachers and other school staff; increased aggression and carrying of weapons; acceptance of violence as a reasonable form of conflictresolution.Reducing school violence, therefore, remains a major concern of educators, parents, and policy makers. Consequently,an essential aspect of school violence prevention is the identification and implementation of interventions and strategiesdesigned to prevent or reduce minor as well as more seriousforms of violence in schools. Moreover, we know that studentswho feel connected to their school are also more likely to havebetter academic achievement, including higher grades and testscores, have better school attendance, and stay in school longer(Resnick et al., 1997).However, administrators and teachers are already undergrowing pressure to improve test scores, as well as meet otherprotocols and guidelines that make it increasingly difficult tomanage all these demands, while also facing significant budgetary restrictions. Consequently, according to Greene (2005),educators too often adopt ineffective “quick-fix” solutions tostem violence in their schools including: suspension or expelling of large numbers of disruptive students, electronic securitymeasures, or a single limited psychosocial program.Walker (1995) identified several major issues contributingto violence-poverty, racism, unemployment, substance abuse,easy to access weapons, inadequate or abusive parents, andexposure to violence in the media. He claims that most tacticsimplemented in schools to deal with the violence issue areone-dimensional (such as removing the child from the classroom upon the incidence of a violent act). These tactics are47effective in protecting students at the moment, but do nothingto deter them from continuing on with criminal careers. Walkersuggests schools should implement peer conflict-resolutionprograms and student training in empathy, cooperation, andperspective-taking. Though formal research on such efforts islimited, he believes data is beginning to accumulate suggestingpeer education improves school climate, increases self-esteemand confidence, and encourages students to have more personalresponsibility.After tracking an increase in youth gun violence since themid-1980s, as well as increasing gun traffic in schools, Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga (1996) put forward a prevention modelto target the illicit market of guns as the primary issue needingto be addressed. In Boston, like other major urban centers, gunacquisition is a problem for youth, not primarily because ofdrug trafficking, but because of fear, for self-defense. Since1995, the Boston Gun Project has met biweekly to study theviolence dynamic in treatment areas and to monitor gun purchase and robbery. The Gun Project was deemed successfulenough to expand to many different jurisdictions across thecountry (Braga, et al., 2008).The “Bruno Effect” was a low cost initiative that utilized thenotion of an Adult Protective Shield. Members of the JamaicanConstabulary Force were trained in how to be community-oriented actors within schools. They were to act as “Gentle Warriors,” carrying the weight of the law outside of the schooldoors but acting as peacemakers-positive, rather than strictlypunitive-authority figures. They were each affiliated with aparticular school. Because most problems arose during classes,when students often roamed the hallways, the Warriors wouldpatrol the hallways to enforce attendance. The Bruno Effecthad four stages: (a) Address one disciplinary issue, like tuckingin shirts; (b) Establish a clubhouse for formal meetings on violence prevention and life skills, followed by recreationalsports. The students who attended were called the HonorGroup and worked to help the leader; (c) Weapons confiscation; (d) Work with parents as an outreach specialist to ensurethe prevention learning went home as well.According to Sacco and Twemlo (1997), the results of theprogram were a decrease in sexual harassment, a majorincrease in classroom attendance, and a decrease of frequencyof school violence. Due to funding restrictions, the programwas cut and violence returned to previous levels.Bucher and Manning (2005) state that most of the anti-violence programs implemented in schools after Columbine havesince faded out or have been abandoned. The ones that remainare basic ordinances of ID badges and visitor policies, andthese are insufficient. At their best, they keep guns away, butstudents still need to feel “emotionally and intellectually safe.”The authors cite a need to increase student-teacher cooperationand a common “conflict management language.” There needsto be a sense of community and a positive process-basedmodel, rather than a negative/problem-centered model focusedon metal detectors and surveillance cameras. The authors callfor a stronger support system and counseling opportunities tohelp students grow in emotional literacy. They recommend setting up teachers as role models for warmth and embrace in theface of diversity.
48JOHNSON, GLUCK, VAZQUEZ, AND WUBBENHORSTIn a study of nine ‘atypical’ schools - those that are low inviolence yet situated in high violence areas, Astor, Benbenishty, and Estrada (2009) find that the most important variablein safe schools is the leadership of the principal. The principalbuffers the school from outside violence by establishing ahealthy culture in the building with a strong sense of authorityand control. In times of transition, from one principal to thenext, there is typically a culture shift or an increase in violence.Furthermore, the authors report that school cultures and expectations for behavior must be adjusted for the age of the studentand the broader cultural context.Wilson and Lipsey (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of 219studies on reducing school violence. All school ages wereincluded in the studies Wilson and Lipsey reviewed, from preschool through high school, and the average age was around10. In general, schools that were studied were selected becauseof some environmental or neighborhood risk, such as povertyor high crime rates. Importantly, most of these 219 studieswere conducted mainly for research purposes with high levelsof researcher involvement (research and demonstration programs), and nearly two-thirds of the programs were less than20 weeks in duration, and almost 40% suffered from implementation problems.In addition, the studies included in the Wilson and Lipseymeta-analysis evaluated violence intervention programs delivered: (a) in classroom settings, (b) to select students due to thepresence of some risk factor, or (c) to students placed withinspecial classrooms because of some behavioral concern. Consequently, though there exists a number of different programsto prevent school violence, there are few evaluations ofschool-wide violence reduction programs like the ViolenceFree Zone.Study Design and MethodologyThis study employed a quasi-experimental evaluationdesign, using data from VFZ students in Custer High School asthe treatment group and all students at non-VFZ schools inMilwaukee as the control group from academic years 2006 to2010. We selected the Milwaukee VFZ program at Custer HighSchool for this study because it was one of the original, andtherefore most established, VFZ programs. Also, CNE’s community partner, Runnin’ Rebels, was able to provide the information on Custer’s VFZ caseload youth that we needed for ourdata request to MPS.The three main research questions for the current evaluationare:1. How do the improvements in behavioral outcomes alreadyshown at the school-level compare to changes in behavioraloutcomes specifically for the VFZ caseload youth?2. Are there academic outcome improvements for the VFZcaseload youth trended over time extending from pre-VFZinvolvement to graduation?3. How do the positive behavioral changes in VFZ caseloadyouth, and the presence of Youth Advisors in the school,affect overall school climate?The research team requested data from MPS for all studentsand the VFZ cohort at Custer High School. The VFZ administrators sent the MPS Data Center a list of ID numbers for allstudents enrolled in the VFZ program at Custer High Schoolfrom academic year 2007 through 2010. The data included theindividual students’ grade levels, disciplinary incidents, GPA,graduations and expulsions, and other details such as types ofdisciplinary action (e.g., suspensions). MPS coded all data withidentification numbers to protect students’ anonymity. The dataprovided by Runnin’ Rebels included the date each studentenrolled in the VFZ program.The current study captured variables associated with a VFZcohort of students before and after enrollment in the programand, in some instances, as compared to the entire school. Wealso examined climate survey trends for Custer High Schoolfrom academic year 2005-06 (a year before VFZ began atCuster High School) and academic year 2010-11.The team sought to answer the following research questionsduring Year 2: Does VFZ membership impact VFZ students’ disciplinaryincident rates? Does VFZ membership influence students’ GPA? Does VFZ membership impact graduation rates? For each question, what is the context of school variablesduring the study period (2006 - 2011)?The following sections describe the methodology used toaddress these questions.Changes in Key Variables for Pre- and Post-VFZ StudentsThe evaluation team was interested in the potential effect ofthe VFZ program on incidents for VFZ students both beforeand after their enrollment in the VFZ program.1. MPS provided a list of incidents by month for all VFZ students which, depending on when the student was enrolled inVFZ, represented incidents occurring before and after theirenrollment in the program.2. Student incidents were separated into two groups: (a) thosethat occurred on or before the month and year they began theVFZ program; and (b) those that occurred the month andyear after they joined the VFZ program.3. The number of months pre-VFZ was determined by countingfrom the month/year when the student was first involved inan incident to the month/year when they enrolled in VFZ(excluding July and August);4. For students that reported no incidents prior to VFZ, wereferred to the MPS Evolved Demographics file and lookedat the earliest “SYS BEGIN DATE” date for an approximation of when the student began at Custer High School, andthen counted the number of months to when they enrolled inthe VFZ program;5. We wanted at least 2 months of pre-VFZ data, therefore wedid not include any VFZ students for which there were not atleast 2 months of time between when they entered Custerand when they enrolled in VFZ. We also did not include anyVFZ students for which there were not at least 2 months oftime in school post-VFZ (i.e., we required at least 2 monthsof post-VFZ data).
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VIOLENCE FREE ZONE6. Once we defined the sample group, we were able to analyzechanges in variables such as average GPA and disciplineincidents. Because we have paired samples of pre- and postVFZ program data, we were able to compare the change inoutcomes for students before and after their participation inthe VFZ program.We used t-test/null hypothesis analyses to determinewhether the average pre- and post-VFZ samples were statistically different from each other. The paired t-test examineswhether the mean of the differences (effect of VFZ program) isdiscernible from zero (no effect). The null hypothesis is thatthe population mean of individual differences of paired observations is 0. Therefore, if the null hypothesis is rejected, theremust be a significant difference (VFZ program effect) betweenthe two samples (pre and post outcomes).School Level VariablesMPS tracks variables such as GPA and disciplinary incidentsat the school and population subset level. We relied on thesereports for summary data, but supplemented these data withadditional MPS and VFZ data, detailed at the student level, andcoded to protect individual student identities (The annualreports, each summarizing data for three school years, areposted online at ngsVFZ Students Pre- and Post-VFZ and Compared to SchoolLevelDisciplinary IncidentsWe examined disciplinary incidents for students from schoolyears 2006-07 through 2010-11. MPS categorizes incidents bytype to include: assault; battery; bullying; chronic disruption orviolation of school rules; disorderly conduct; false fire alarms;fighting; gambling; inappropriate personal property; intent todistribute, use of, or possession of drugs, alcohol or medications; leaving classroom without permission; loitering; possession of stolen property; possession/use of weapon; refusal towork or follow instructions; repeated classroom disruption; tardiness; truancy; and verbal abuse.We had complete data for 90 VFZ student records, which weexamined using the previously described methodology, comparing average discipline incidents before and after the students joined VFZ. Table 1 includes summary statistics of twovariables (Pre-VFZ Incidents/Month, Post-VFZ Incidents/Month) and then indicates results of the paired t-testusing the differences of matched pairs.Table 1.Incidents/Month (Pre- and Post-VFZ intervention)Variable# of ObservationsAverage # ofIncidents/MonthStandard ErrorStandard Deviation95% ConfidenceInternalPre-VFZ Incidents/Month901.200.0951.90231.011 - 1.389Post-VFZ Incidents/Month90.677.0751.7128.528 - .827744%.0832.7897.357 - .688% Reduction in Incident/MonthAs shown in Table 1, VFZ students averaged 1.2 in
The College of Juvenile Justice and Psychology at Prairie View A&M University invites papers for publication in the . University of Texas, Brownsville, Texas Barbara Scobey, Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services, Austin, Texas Alejandro del Carmen, University of Texas, Arlington, Texas Kathryn Sellers, Kaplan University, Boca .