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FireEye CM Series: CM-4400,CM-7400, CM-9400FireEye, Inc.FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security PolicyDocument Version: 0.4Prepared By:Acumen Security18504 Office Park DrMontgomery Village, MD 20886www.acumensecurity.net1
FIPS 140-2 Security Policyv0.3Table of Contents1.2.Introduction . 41.1Purpose. 41.2Document Organization . 41.3Notices . 4FireEye CM Series: CM-4400, CM-7400, CM-9400 . 52.1Cryptographic Module Specification . 62.1.12.2Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces . 72.3Roles, Services, and Authentication . 82.3.1Authorized Roles . 82.3.2Authentication Mechanisms . 82.3.3Services . 102.4Physical Security . 142.5Cryptographic Key Management . 152.6Cryptographic Algorithm . 182.6.1FIPS-approved Algorithms . 182.6.2Non-Approved Algorithms allowed for use in FIPS-mode . 182.6.3Non-Approved Algorithms . 192.7Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) . 192.8Self-Tests . 202.8.1Power-On Self-Tests . 202.8.2Conditional Self-Tests . 202.8.3Self-Tests Error Handling . 202.93.Mitigation of Other Attacks . 21Secure Operation . 223.1Secure Distribution . 223.1.1Firmware Distribution. 223.1.2Hardware Distribution . 223.2Installation . 223.3Initialization . 223.3.12Cryptographic Boundary . 6Enable Trusted Platform Module . 22
FIPS 140-2 Security Policyv0.33.3.2Enable compliance configuration options . 223.3.3Enable FIPS 140-2 compliance . 233.4Management . 233.4.1SSH Usage . 233.4.1.1Symmetric Encryption Algorithms: . 233.4.1.2KEX Algorithms: . 233.4.1.3Message Authentication Code (MAC) Algorithms: . 233.4.23.5TLS Usage . 24Additional Information . 24Appendix A: Acronyms . 253
FIPS 140-2 Security Policyv0.31. IntroductionThis is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the FireEye CM Series: CM-4400, CM7400, CM-9400. Below are the details of the product validated:Hardware Version: CM-4400, CM-7400, CM-9400Software Version #: 7.6.0FIPS 140-2 Security Level: 11.1PurposeThis document was prepared as Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2validation evidence. The document describes how the FireEye CM Series: CM-4400, CM-7400,CM-9400 meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2. It also provides instructions toindividuals and organizations on how to deploy the product in a secure FIPS-approved mode ofoperation. Target audience of this document is anyone who wishes to use or integrate thisproduct into a solution that is meant to comply with FIPS 140-2 requirements.1.2Document OrganizationThe Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In additionto this document, the Submission Package contains:Vendor Evidence documentFinite State MachineOther supporting documentation as additional referencesThis Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced byAcumen Security, LLC. under contract to FireEye, Inc. With the exception of this NonProprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package is proprietary to FireEye, Inc.and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements.1.3NoticesThis document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.4
FIPS 140-2 Security Policyv0.32. FireEye CM Series: CM-4400, CM-7400, CM-9400The FireEye CM Series: CM-4400, CM-7400, CM-9400 (the module) is a multi-chip standalonemodule validated at FIPS 140-2 Security Level 1. Specifically, the module meets the followingsecurity levels for individual sections in the FIPS 140-2 standard:Table 1 - Security Level for Each FIPS 140-2 Section#12345678910115Section TitleCryptographic Module SpecificationCryptographic Module Ports and InterfacesRoles, Services, and AuthenticationFinite State ModelPhysical SecurityOperational EnvironmentCryptographic Key ManagementEMI/EMCSelf-TestsDesign AssurancesMitigation Of Other AttacksSecurity Level11311N/A1113N/A
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy2.1v0.3Cryptographic Module SpecificationThe FireEye CM series is a group of management platforms that consolidates theadministration, reporting, and data sharing of the FireEye NX, EX, FX and AX series in one easyto-deploy, network-based platform. Within the FireEye deployment, the FireEye CM enablesreal-time sharing of the auto-generated threat intelligence to identify and block advancedattacks targeting the organization. It also enables centralized configuration, management, andreporting of FireEye platforms.2.1.1 Cryptographic BoundaryThe cryptographic boundary for the module is defined as encompassing the "top," "front,""left," "right," and "bottom" surfaces of the case and all portions of the "backplane" of the case.The following figures provide a physical depiction of the cryptographic module. The followingimages depict the CM-4400, CM-7400, and CM-9400.Figure 1: FireEye CM-4400Figure 2: FireEye CM-7400Figure 3: FireEye CM-94006
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy2.2v0.3Cryptographic Module Ports and InterfacesThe module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physicalinterfaces provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces:data input, data output, control input, and status output. The logical interfaces and theirmapping are described in the following table:Table 2 - Module Interface Mapping – CM-4400/CM-7400/CM-9400FIPS InterfaceData InputData OutputControl InputStatus OutputPower Interface7Physical Interface(2x) 10/100/1000 BASE-T Ports (Network Monitoring)(2x) 10/100/1000 BASE-T Ports (Management)PS/2 Keyboard and Mouse Ports(2x) USB PortsSerial Port(2x) 10/100/1000 BASE-T Ports (Network Monitoring)(2x) 10/100/1000 BASE-T Ports (Management)DB15 VGA Port(2x) USB PortsSerial Port(2x) 10/100/1000 BASE-T Ports (Management)PS/2 Keyboard and Mouse Ports(2x) USB PortsSerial Port(2x) 10/100/1000 BASE-T Ports (Management)DB15 VGA Port(2x) USB PortsSerial PortPower Port
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy2.3v0.3Roles, Services, and AuthenticationThe following sections provide details about roles supported by the module, how these rolesare authenticated and the services the roles are authorized to access.2.3.1 Authorized RolesThe module supports several different roles, including multiple Cryptographic Officer roles, aUser role, and an unauthenticated role.Configuration of the module can occur over several interfaces and at different levels dependingupon the role assigned to the user. There are multiple types of Cryptographic Officers that mayconfigure the module, as follows: Admin: The system administrator is a “super user” who has all capabilities. The primaryfunction of this role is to configure the system.Monitor: The system monitor has read-only access to some things the admin role canchange or configure.Operator: The system operator has a subset of the capabilities associated with theadmin role. Its primary function is configuring and monitoring the system.Analyst: The system analyst focuses on data plane analysis and possesses severalcapabilities, including setting up alerts and reports.Auditor: The system auditor reviews audit logs and performs forensic analysis to tracehow events occurred.SNMP: The SNMP role provides system monitoring through SNMPv3.WSAPI: The WSAPI role supports system administration via a TLS authenticatedinterface.The Users of the module are the remote IT devices and remote management clients accessingthe module via cryptographic protocols. These protocols include, SSH, TLS, and SNMPv3.Unauthenticated users are only able to access the module LEDs and power cycle the module.2.3.2 Authentication MechanismsThe module supports identity-based authentication. Module operators must authenticate tothe module before being allowed access to services, which require the assumption of anauthorized role. The module employs the authentication methods described in the table belowto authenticate Crypto-Officers and Users.Table 3 - Authentication Mechanism DetailsRoleAdmin8Type Of AuthenticationPassword/UsernameAuthentication StrengthAll passwords must be between 8 and 32 characters.If (8) integers are used for an eight digit password,the probability of randomly guessing the correct
FIPS 140-2 Security PolicyRoleMonitorOperatorAnalystAuditorSNMPType Of AuthenticationWSAPIUserPassword/Username orAsymmetric Authenticationv0.3Authentication Strengthsequence is one (1) in 100,000,000 (this calculation isbased on the assumption that the typical standardAmerican QWERTY computer keyboard has 10Integer digits. The calculation should be 10 8 100,000,000). Therefore, the associated probabilityof a successful random attempt is approximately 1 in100,000,000, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000required by FIPS 140-2. In order to successfully guessthe sequence in one minute would require the abilityto make over 1,666,666 guesses per second, whichfar exceeds the operational capabilities of themodule.All passwords must be between 8 and 32 characters.If (8) integers are used for an eight digit password,the probability of randomly guessing the correctsequence is one (1) in 100,000,000 (this calculation isbased on the assumption that the typical standardAmerican QWERTY computer keyboard has 10Integer digits. The calculation should be 10 8 100,000,000). Therefore, the associated probabilityof a successful random attempt is approximately 1 in100,000,000, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000required by FIPS 140-2. In order to successfully guessthe sequence in one minute would require the abilityto make over 1,666,666 guesses per second, whichfar exceeds the operational capabilities of themodule.When using RSA based authentication, RSA key pairhas modulus size of 2048 bit, thus providing 112 bitsof strength. Therefore, an attacker would have a 1 in2 112 chance of randomly obtaining the key, whichis much stronger than the one in a million chancerequired by FIPS 140-2. For RSA-basedauthentication, to exceed a 1 in 100,000 probabilityof a successful random key guess in one minute, anattacker would have to be capable of approximately3.25X10 32 attempts per minute, which far exceedsthe operational capabilities of the modules tosupport.9
FIPS 140-2 Security Policyv0.32.3.3 ServicesThe services that are available to unauthenticated entities and the services that requireoperators to assume an authorized role (Crypto-Officer or User) are listed in the table below.Please note that the keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) listed below use the followingindicators to show the type of access required: R (Read): The CSP is read W (Write): The CSP is established, generated, or modified Z (Zeroize): The CSP is zeroizedTable 4 - ServicesServiceDescriptionSSH to externalIT deviceSecureconnectionbetween a CMand otherFireEyeappliances usingSSH.RoleUserAdministrative Secure remoteaccess over SSH command lineapplianceadministrationover an ministrativeaccess overAdmin,Monitor,10Secure remoteGUI applianceKey/CSP and Type of Access DRBG entropy input (R)DRBG Seed (R)DRBG V (R/W/Z)DRBG Key (R/W/Z)Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman private key (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman public key (R/W/Z)SSH Private Key (R/W/Z)SSH Public Key (R/W/Z)SSH Session Key (R/W/Z)SSH Integrity Key (R/W/Z)Admin Password (R/W/Z)Monitor Password (R/W/Z)Operator Password (R/W/Z)Analyst Password (R/W/Z)Auditor Password (R/W/Z)DRBG entropy input (R)DRBG Seed (R)DRBG V (R/W/Z)DRBG Key (R/W/Z)Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman private key (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman public key (R/W/Z)SSH Private Key (R/W/Z)SSH Public Key (R/W/Z)SSH Session Key (R/W/Z)SSH Integrity Key (R/W/Z)Admin Password (R/W/Z)Monitor Password (R/W/Z)
FIPS 140-2 Security onover a cess overWSAPISecure remoteapplianceadministrationover a TLStunnel.WSAPIAdministrativeaccess overserial consoleand VGADirectlyconnectedcommand ,Analyst,AuditorSNMPv3Secure erconnection usedto upload data tothe FireEyecloud.DTI connection11Key/CSP and Type of Access Operator Password (R/W/Z)Analyst Password (R/W/Z)Auditor Password (R/W/Z)DRBG entropy input (R)DRBG Seed (R)DRBG V (R/W/Z)DRBG Key (R/W/Z)Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman private key (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman public key (R/W/Z)TLS Private Key (R/W/Z)TLS Public Key (R/W/Z)TLS Pre-Master Secret (R/W/Z)TLS Session Encryption Key (R/W/Z)WSAPI Password (R/W/Z)DRBG entropy input (R)DRBG Seed (R)DRBG V (R/W/Z)DRBG Key (R/W/Z)Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman private key (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman public key (R/W/Z)TLS Private Key (R/W/Z)TLS Public Key (R/W/Z)TLS Pre-Master Secret (R/W/Z)TLS Session Encryption Key (R/W/Z)Admin Password (R/W/Z)Monitor Password (R/W/Z)Operator Password (R/W/Z)Analyst Password (R/W/Z)Auditor Password (R/W/Z)SNMP Session Key (R/W/Z)SNMPv3 password (R/W/Z) DRBG entropy input (R)DRBG Seed (R)DRBG V (R/W/Z)DRBG Key (R/W/Z)
FIPS 140-2 Security PolicyServiceDescriptionv0.3RoleLDAP over TLSSecure remoteUserauthenticationvia TLS protectedLDAPSecure logtransferTLS-basedconnection witha remote auditserver.UserSecure HATLS-basedconnection witha remoteapplianceAdmin,Operator12Key/CSP and Type of Access Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman private key (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman public key (R/W/Z)TLS Private Key (R/W/Z)TLS Public Key (R/W/Z)TLS Pre-Master Secret (R/W/Z)TLS Session Encryption Key (R/W/Z)Admin Password (R/W/Z)Monitor Password (R/W/Z)Operator Password (R/W/Z)Analyst Password (R/W/Z)Auditor Password (R/W/Z)DRBG entropy input (R)DRBG Seed (R)DRBG V (R/W/Z)DRBG Key (R/W/Z)Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman private key (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman public key (R/W/Z)TLS Private Key (R/W/Z)TLS Public Key (R/W/Z)TLS Pre-Master Secret (R/W/Z)TLS Session Encryption Key (R/W/Z)DRBG entropy input (R)DRBG Seed (R)DRBG V (R/W/Z)DRBG Key (R/W/Z)Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman private key (R/W/Z)Diffie Hellman public key (R/W/Z)TLS Private Key (R/W/Z)TLS Public Key (R/W/Z)TLS Pre-Master Secret (R/W/Z)TLS Session Encryption Key (R/W/Z)DRBG entropy input (R)DRBG Seed (R)DRBG V (R/W/Z)DRBG Key (R/W/Z)Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret (R/W/Z)
FIPS 140-2 Security PolicyServiceDescriptionShow StatusView theoperationalstatus of themoduleZeroization mzeroization of allpersistent CSPswithin themoduleStatus LEDOutputView status viathe ModulesLEDs.Reboot ofappliance.Cycle Power/Perform SelfTestsR – Read, W – Write, Z – ditor,Un-authKey/CSP and Type of Access Diffie Hellman private key (R/W/Z) Diffie Hellman public key (R/W/Z) TLS Private Key (R/W/Z) TLS Public Key (R/W/Z) TLS Pre-Master Secret (R/W/Z) TLS Session Encryption Key (R/W/Z)N/A Admin Password (Z) Monitor Password (Z) Operator Password (Z) Analyst Password (Z) Auditor Password (Z) SSH Private Key (Z) SSH Public Key (Z) SNMPv3 password (Z) TLS Private Key (Z) TLS Public Key (Z)N/A DRBG entropy input (Z)DRBG Seed (Z)DRBG V (Z)DRBG Key (Z)Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret (Z)Diffie Hellman private key (Z)Diffie Hellman public key (Z)SSH Session Key (Z)SSH Integrity Key (Z)SNMPv3 session key (Z)TLS Pre-Master Secret (Z)TLS Session Encryption Key (Z)TLS Session Integrity Key (Z)
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy2.4Physical SecurityThe modules are production grade multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules that meetLevel 1 physical security requirements.14v0.3
2.5Cryptographic Key ManagementThe following table identifies each of the CSPs associated with the module. For each CSP, the following information is provided, The name of the CSP/Key The type of CSP and associated length A description of the CSP/Key Storage of the CSP/Key The zeroization for the CSP/KeyTable 5 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPsKey/CSPDRBG entropyinputDRBG SeedTypeCTR 256-bitDescriptionThis is the entropy for SP 800-90 RNG.StorageZeroizationDRAMDevice power cycle.CTR 256-bitDRAMDevice power cycle.DRBG VCTR 256-bitDRAMDevice power cycle.DRBG KeyCTR 256-bitDRAMDevice power cycle.Diffie-HellmanShared SecretDiffie Hellmanprivate keyDiffie Hellmanpublic keySSH Private KeyDH 2048 – 4096bitsDH 2048 – 4096bitsDH 2048 – 4096bitsRSA (Private Key)2048 – 3072 bitsRSA (Public Key)2048 – 3072 bitsTriple-DES 192bitsThis DRBG seed is collected from the onboard hardwareentropy source.Internal V value used as part of SP800-90 CTR DRBG.Internal Key value used as part of SP800-90 CTR DRBG.The shared exponent used in Diffie-Hellman (DH)exchange. Created per the Diffie-Hellman protocol.The private exponent used in Diffie-Hellman (DH)exchange.The p used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange.DRAMDevice power cycle.DRAMDevice power cycle.DRAMDevice power cycle.The SSH private key for the module used for sessionauthentication.The SSH public key for the module used for sessionauthentication.The SSH session key. This key is created through SSHkey establishment.NVRAMOverwritten w/ “00”prior to replacement.Overwritten w/ “00”prior to replacement.Device power cycle.SSH Public KeySSH Session Key15NVRAMDRAM
FIPS 140-2 Security PolicyKey/CSPSSH Integrity KeySNMPv3 passwordSNMPv3 sessionkeyTLS Private KeyTLS Public KeyTLS Pre-MasterSecretTLS SessionEncryption KeyTLS SessionIntegrity KeyAdmin PasswordMonitor Password16TypeAES 128, 256 bitsHMAC-SHA1,HMAC-SHA-256HMAC-512Shared Secret, atleast eightcharactersAES 128 bitsRSA (Private Key)2048 – 3072 bitsECDSA (224 –512 bits)RSA (Public Key)2048 – 3072 bitsECDSA (224 –512 bits)Shared Secret,384 bitsTriple-DES 192bitsAES 128, 256 bitsv0.3DescriptionStorageZeroizationThe SSH data integrity key. This key is created throughSSH key establishment.DRAMDevice power cycle.This secret is used to derive HMAC-SHA1 key forSNMPv3 Authentication.NVRAMOverwritten w/ “00”prior to replacement.SNMP symmetric encryption key used toencrypt/decrypt SNMP traffic.This private key is used for TLS session authentication.DRAMDevice power cycle.NVRAMOverwritten w/ “00”prior to replacement.This public key is used for TLS session authentication.NVRAMOverwritten w/ “00”prior to replacement.Shared Secret created using asymmetric cryptographyfrom which new TLS session keys can be created.Key used to encrypt/decrypt TLS session data.DRAMDevice power cycle.DRAMDevice power cycle.DRAMDevice power cycle.NVRAMOverwritten w/ “00”prior to replacement.Overwritten w/ “00”HMAC SHA-1 160 HMAC-SHA-1 used for TLS data integrity protection.bitsShared Secret,Authentication password for the Admin user role.8 charactersShared Secret,Authentication password for the Monitor user role.NVRAM
FIPS 140-2 Security PolicyKey/CSPOperator PasswordAnalyst PasswordAuditor PasswordWSAPI Password17Type8 charactersShared Secret,8 charactersShared Secret,8 charactersShared Secret,8 charactersShared Secret,8 charactersv0.3DescriptionStorageAuthentication password for the Operator user role.NVRAMAuthentication password for the Analyst user role.NVRAMAuthentication password for the Audit user role.NVRAMAuthentication password for the WSAPI user role.NVRAMZeroizationprior to replacement.Overwritten w/ “00”prior to replacement.Overwritten w/ “00”prior to replacement.Overwritten w/ “00”prior to replacement.Overwritten w/ “00”prior to replacement.
2.6Cryptographic Algorithm2.6.1 FIPS-approved AlgorithmsThe following table identifies the FIPS-approved algorithms included in the module for use inthe FIPS mode of operation.Table 6 – FIPS-approved AlgorithmsCryptographic AlgorithmTriple-DESCAVP Cert. #1941AES3447HMAC-SHS2195SHS2837, 2836RSA1759, 1758ECDSA696DRBG843CVL533UsageUsed for encryption of SSH and TLSsessions.Used for encryption of SSH, SNMP, and TLSsessions. Used in support of FIPS-approvedDRBG.Note: The module use of AES GCM complieswith the Guidelines for the Selection,Configuration, and Use of Transport LayerSecurity (TLS) Implementations defined inSP 800-52.Used for SSH and TLS traffic integrity. Usedin support of SSH, SNMP, and TLS keyderivation.Used for SSH, SNMP, and TLS trafficintegrity. Used in support of SSH, SNMP,and TLS key derivation.Firmware load testUsed for SSH and TLS Sessionauthentication.Firmware load testUsed for TLS Session authentication.Supported curves include, P-256 P-384 P521.Used in support of SSH and TLS sessions.Used to seed RSA key generation.SSH, TLS, and SNMP Key Derivation.Note: The TLS, SSH, and SNMP protocols havenot been reviewed or tested by the CAVP andCMVP.2.6.2 Non-Approved Algorithms allowed for use in FIPS-modeThe cryptographic module implements the following non-Approved algorithms that are allowedfor use in FIPS-mode:18
FIPS 140-2 Security Policyv0.3 Diffie-Hellman – provides between 112 and 150-bits of encryption strength. DiffieHellman with less than 112-bits of security strength is non-compliant and may not beused. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman – provides between 112 and 256-bits of encryptionstrength. Supported curves, include, P-256 P-384 P-521. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellmanwith less than 112-bits of security strength is non-compliance and may not be used. RSA Key Wrapping – provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength. RSAwith less than 112-bits of security strength is non-compliant and may not be used. Non-approved NDRNG for seeding the DRBG.2.6.3 Non-Approved AlgorithmsThe cryptographic module implements the following non-approved algorithms that are notpermitted for use in FIPS 140-2 mode of operations:Table 7 – Non-Approved AlgorithmsServiceSSH*TLS*SNMP*Non-Approved AlgorithmHashing: MD5,MACing: HMAC MD5Symmetric: DESAsymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-HellmanHashing: MD5,MACing: HMAC MD5Symmetric: DES, RC4Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-HellmanHashing: MD5,MACing: HMAC MD5Symmetric: DES, RC4Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-HellmanNote: Services marked with a single asterisk (*) may use non-compliant cryptographicalgorithms. Use of these algorithms are prohibited in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.2.7Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)All CM appliances are FCC (Part 15 Class-A), CE (Class-A), CNS, AS/NZS, VCCI (Class A) certified.19
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy2.8v0.3Self-TestsSelf-tests are health checks that ensure that the cryptographic algorithms within the moduleare operating correctly. The self-tests identified in FIPS 140-2 broadly fall within two categories Power-On Self-Tests Conditional Self-Tests2.8.1 Power-On Self-TestsThe cryptographic module performs the following self-tests at Power-On: Software integrity (SHA-256) HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA224 Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA256 Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA384 Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA512 Known Answer Test AES-128 ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test AES-128 ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test AES-GCM-256 Encrypt Known Answer Test AES-GCM-256 Decrypt Known Answer Test Triple-DES Encrypt Known Answer Test Triple-DES Decrypt Known Answer Test RSA Known Answer Test ECDSA Known Answer Test DRBG Known Answer Test2.8.2 Conditional Self-TestsThe cryptographic module performs the following conditional self-tests: Continuous Random Number Generator Test (CRNGT) for FIPS-approved DRBG Continuous Random Number Generator (CRNGT) for Entropy Source Firmware Load Test (2048-bit RSA, SHA-256) Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for RSA Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for ECDSA2.8.3 Self-Tests Error HandlingIf any of the identified POSTs fail, the module will not enter an operational state and willinstead provide an error message and reboot. If either of the CRNGTs fail, the repeated randomnumbers are discarded and another random number is requested. If either of the PWCTs fail,the key pair or signature is discarded and another key pair or signature is generated. If theFirmware Load Test fails, the new firmware is not loaded.Both during execution of the self-tests and while in an error state, data output is inhibited.20
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy2.9v0.3Mitigation of Other AttacksThe module does not claim to mitigate any other attacks beyond those specified in FIPS 140.21
FIPS 140-2 Security Policyv0.33. Secure OperationThe following steps are required to put the module into a FIPS-approved mode of operation.3.1Secure DistributionThe following activities ensure secure distribution and delivery of the module:3.1.1 Firmware DistributionThe module firmware is distributed via secure download from DTI. When newly downloadedfirmware is loaded, the module performs a firmware load test verifying the integrity of theimage.3.1.2 Hardware DistributionThe module hardware is shipped in sealed boxes. This boxes will indicate any tampering duringthe delivery process. Upon delivery, the recipient must inspect the package the module isdelivered in to verify that there has been no tampering.3.2InstallationThere are no FIPS 140 specific hardware installation steps required.3.3Initialization3.3.1 Enable Trusted Platform ModuleEnable the on board TPM which is used as an entropy source for the implemented FIPSapproved DRBG.1. Enter the CLI configuration mode:hostname enablehostname # configure terminal2. Check if the TPM is present and enabled.hostname (config) # show tpm3. Enable the TPM:hostname (config) # tpm enable4. After reading the warning, select yes to continue.5. Restart the appliance.3.3.2 Enable compliance configuration optionsPerform the following steps to enable FIPS 140-2 configuration options on the webUI.1. Enter the CLI configuration mode:hostname enablehostname # configure terminal2. Enable the compliance configuration options on the webUI:compliance options webui enable22
FIPS 140-2 Security Policyv0.33.3.3 Enable FIPS 140-2 complianceThere are two methods to enable FIPS 140-2 compliance on the appliance. Compliance may beenabled either through the webUI or through the CLI. Perform the following to enable FIPS 1402 compliance through the webUI.1.2.3.4.5.On the Web UI
The FireEye CM Series: CM-4400, CM-7400, CM-9400 (the module) is a multi-chip standalone . administration, reporting, and data sharing of the FireEye NX, EX, FX and AX series in one easy-to-deploy, network-based platform. Within the FireEye deployment, the FireEye CM enables
