SECTION 2: CHINESE INVESTMENT IN THEUNITED STATESKey Findings Chinese government policies, coupled with increased investoruncertainty in China, have contributed to increased investmentflows to the United States in recent years. In 2017, Chineseinvestment flows to the United States are expected to declinerelative to 2016 as the Chinese government seeks to limit capital outflows and fend off risks from mounting corporate debt. Sectors of the U.S. economy deemed strategic by the Chinesegovernment are more likely to be targeted by Chinese firms forinvestment, while Chinese investments in nonstrategic sectorslike entertainment, real estate, and hospitality are decliningamid Chinese Communist Party efforts to limit capital outflowsand reduce corporate debt. Some Chinese firms seek to obscure their dealings in the UnitedStates through U.S.-based shell companies or attempt to drivedown the value of U.S. assets through sophisticated cyber espionage campaigns. These firms are becoming more sophisticatedin their attempts to circumvent Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reviews and other U.S. investment regulations. Greenfield investments in the United States are not subject tothe CFIUS review process, which may raise national securityrisks. Although the number of Chinese greenfield investmentsin the United States remains limited compared to acquisitionsof U.S. assets, federal laws and screening mechanisms do notsufficiently require federal authorities to evaluate whether agreenfield investment may pose a national security threat. The application of the sovereign immunity defense to commercial cases presents a potential risk for U.S. businesses and individuals, allowing Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) toconduct unlawful activity in the United States without legalconsequences. Some Chinese SOEs are evading legal action inthe United States by invoking their status as a foreign government entity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The opaque nature of China’s financial system makes it impossible to verify the accuracy of Chinese companies’ financial disclosures and auditing reports. Chinese businesses continue tolist on U.S. stock exchanges to raise capital, despite operatingoutside the laws and regulations governing U.S. firms. U.S. regulators have struggled to deter Chinese fraud schemeson U.S. exchanges, with Chinese issuers stealing billions of dol(71)
72lars from U.S. investors. Efforts to prosecute the issuers of thefraudulent securities have been unsuccessful, with Chinese regulators choosing not to pursue firms or individuals for crimescommitted by Chinese companies listed overseas. Some Chinese companies operate with little oversight underChina’s opaque financial system, leaving U.S. investors exposedto exploitative and fraudulent schemes perpetrated by China-based issuers. Negotiations between the Public CompanyAccounting Oversight Board and its counterparts in China haveresulted in little progress toward securing increased cross-border transparency and accountability.RecommendationsThe Commission recommends: Congress consider legislation updating the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) statute to address current and evolving security risks. Among the issuesCongress should consider are: Prohibiting the acquisition of U.S. assets by Chinese state-ownedor state-controlled entities, including sovereign wealth funds. Requiring a mandatory review of any transaction involvingthe acquisition of a controlling interest in U.S. assets by Chinese entities not falling under the above class of acquiringentities. Requiring reviews of investments in U.S.-based greenfieldassets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potentialharm to U.S. national and economic security. Expanding the definition of “control” to include joint ventures, venture capital funds, licensing agreements, and otherarrangements or agreements that enable Chinese entities toaccess and/or determine the disposition of any asset. Prohibiting any acquisition or investment that would confer“control” with regard to critical technologies or infrastructure.The U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, andDefense shall prepare and regularly update a list of criticaltechnologies or infrastructure that would not be eligible foracquisition or investment by any Chinese entities to ensureU.S. economic and national security interests are protected. Including a net economic benefit test to assess the impact ofacquisitions by Chinese entities in the United States to ensure they advance U.S. national economic interests. Requiring that any proposed acquisition of a media propertyby a Chinese entity be assessed in terms of the acquiring entity’s history of adhering to Chinese Communist Party propaganda objectives and its potential to influence public opinionin the United States. Authorizing an independent review panel, appointed by Congress, to review the actions and activities of CFIUS on a continuing basis.
73 Allowing any CFIUS member agency to bring a transactionup for review and investigation. Congress consider legislation conditioning the provision of market access to Chinese investors in the United States on a reciprocal, sector-by-sector basis to provide a level playing field forU.S. investors in China. Congress amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)of 1976 to: Allow U.S. courts to hear cases against a foreign state’s corporate affiliates under the commercial activity exception. Require Chinese firms to waive any potential claim of sovereign immunity if they do business in the United States. Congress consider legislation to ban and delist companiesseeking to list on U.S. stock exchanges that are based incountries that have not signed a reciprocity agreement withthe Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).IntroductionChina is increasing its investments in the United States, particularly in sectors deemed strategic by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These investments support the global competitiveness ofChinese firms by allowing them to access capital and technologiesnot available in their home market. Chinese mergers and acquisitions in the United States present a new set of challenges, not justfor U.S. businesses and economic interests, but also for regulatorsprotecting vital U.S. national security interests.Chinese companies are also increasing their presence on U.S.stock markets. Today, around 130 Chinese companies are listed onmajor U.S. stock exchanges, including Chinese Internet giants Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu. However, the complex legal structures ofthese U.S. listings, as well as China’s state secrecy laws and opaqueauditing practices allow some Chinese companies to shield themselves from U.S. legal and regulatory jurisdiction. As a result, theselistings could pose significant risks for unsuspecting U.S. investorswho buy into U.S.-listed Chinese companies.This section examines trends and implications of increasedChinese investment in the United States, and the activities ofChinese companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges. In doing so, itdraws from the Commission’s January 2017 hearing on Chineseinvestment in the United States, contracted research, consultations with economic and foreign policy experts, and open sourceresearch and analysis.Chinese Investment in the United StatesChinese annual foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the United States have increased significantly in recent years, fueled by thepursuit of higher returns abroad amid China’s economic slowdownand government policies encouraging investment abroad. Officialstatistics from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis indicate theUnited States attracted more than 373 billion of global FDI flowsin 2016, of which around 27.6 billion, or 7.4 percent, came from
74China.1 However, official estimates do not include Chinese entitiesbased outside China, suggesting the actual level of FDI flows fromChina is much higher.* From 2010 to 2016, the private U.S. economicconsultancy Rhodium Group estimates annual Chinese investmentin the United States rose from 4.6 billion to 46.2 billion.2Through the first half of 2017, Rhodium Group estimates Chinese FDI flows to the United States totaled 24.7 billion.3 Based onJanuary to August 2017 data, Rhodium Group estimates Chineseinvestment will total between 25 and 30 billion by the end of theyear.4 The expected slowdown in China’s FDI flows to the UnitedStates in 2017 is the result of Beijing’s efforts to tighten controlson capital outflows, limiting Chinese firms’ ability to invest moneyabroad (this emerging trend is discussed in greater detail in “Drivers of Chinese Investment,” later in this section).5Figure 1: Chinese Investment in the United States, 2010–H1 20175012045US billions358030602520401510No. of enfield ValueAcquisitions ValueGreenfield No. of DealsAcquisitions No. of DealsSource: Rhodium Group, “China Investment Monitor.” .* Unless noted otherwise, this section relies on private estimates of Chinese FDI in the UnitedStates from Rhodium Group. Both U.S. and Chinese official statistics underestimate the volumeof Chinese investment because they do not fully account for flows of FDI, including investmentrouted through Hong Kong and other offshore financial centers. Official data are also providedafter a significant delay, hindering analysis. For example, as the International Trade Administration (ITA), a bureau within the U.S. Department of Commerce, stated in a 2013 report producedat the Commission’s recommendation, estimates from Rhodium Group showed 6.5 billion ofFDI flows from China to the United States in 2012, while U.S. government estimates showedonly 219 million for the same year. ITA noted that private sector valuations employ differentdefinitions of FDI, data gathering mechanisms, and accounting methods that lead to differencesin reported value of investments. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Report: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the United States from the China and HongKong SAR, July 17, 2013.
75Rhodium Group’s 2016 Report Highlights IncreasingChinese InvestmentIn the 2016 report Chinese Investment in the United States: Recent Trends and the Policy Agenda contracted by the Commission,Rhodium Group assessed recent patterns of Chinese investmentin the United States. The report’s key findings include: Chinese global outbound investment has increased rapidly inrecent years, but there remains significant room for additional growth. If China’s outbound investment follows the historical trend of other emerging economies, its global outboundFDI stock will increase by hundreds of billions of dollars inthe next decade. Chinese government policies impact Chinese outbound FDIindirectly (through economic policies) and directly (throughfinancial incentives and other policies encouraging foreigninvestment in strategic sectors). Chinese investment in the United States presents uniqueeconomic and national security challenges because China hasa non-democratic political system without rule of law and allows the state to intervene heavily in the economy. The discrepancy between market access for Chinese investorsin the United States and U.S. investors in China remains akey concern, particularly in industries dominated by largeChinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).*There are potential economic benefits of investment: Chinese FDIcan help U.S. firms secure the capital necessary to grow their business and hire more workers (or save workers’ jobs), leading to anexpansion of the U.S. tax base, improving productivity, and raisingoverall competitiveness.6 In 2016, Rhodium Group estimates Chinese companies added approximately 50,000 U.S. jobs, bringingthe total number of U.S. jobs provided by Chinese companies to141,000.† However, Chinese investment can also pose risks to theUnited States, with Chinese FDI targeting sectors of strategic importance to the United States. Given the state’s controlling positionin the Chinese economy and the opaque nature of its role in businessactivities, these investments raise concerns about the ability of U.S.regulators to manage the risks of investment from state-influencedentities. Chinese investments, for example, raise concerns aboutthe transfers of valuable U.S. technologies to China.7 They can alsomake it more difficult for U.S. firms to compete in international markets due to the anticompetitive practices of many Chinese firms.8* For the full report, see Thilo Hanemann and Daniel H. Rosen, “Chinese Investment in theUnited States: Recent Trends and the Policy Agenda,” Rhodium Group (prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission), December 2016.† These employment figures only account for full-time jobs provided directly by U.S. subsidiariesof Chinese companies. The majority of U.S. jobs provided by Chinese firms were acquired duringmergers and acquisitions. Daniel H. Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, “New Neighbors 2017 Update:Chinese FDI in the United States by Congressional District,” Rhodium Group, April 2017, 4.
76Drivers of Chinese InvestmentA combination of Chinese government policies and increased investor uncertainty in China contributed to the rise of investment outflowsto the United States from 2010 to 2016. Some factors driving China’sincreased investment in the United States during this period include: Pursuit of advanced technologies: China’s industrial policy seeksto enhance indigenous innovation and develop the country’shigh-technology and environmental industries (including biotechnology, high-end manufacturing equipment, and new-generationinformation technology).9 To this end, the government laid outpolicies in its 13th Five-Year Plan * and other state plans offeringa combination of tax incentives and subsidies to encourage investment in research and development (R&D) and advanced technologies while boosting market demand for Chinese products andfirms (for more on China’s policies relating to the development ofadvanced technologies, see Chapter 4, Section 1, “China’s Pursuitof Dominance in Computing, Robotics, and Biotechnology”).10 Higher returns abroad: With the renminbi’s (RMB) depreciationin recent years and rising concerns over the stability of China’seconomy, Chinese investors increasingly look for returns abroad,particularly in low-risk environments like the United States.11According to data from China’s State Administration of ForeignExchange, capital outflows from China totaled around 647 billionin 2015 and 640 billion in 2016, up from 118 billion in 2014.12 Reduced bureaucratic red tape: In 2013 and 2014, China’s StateCouncil updated its regulations for outbound FDI, raising outboundinvestment approval limits and removing regulatory requirementsfor nonstrategic investments.13 As a result, the threshold for approving overseas investments by local firms and deals increasedfrom 300 million to 1 billion, with most deals under the threshold not requiring approval from the National Development andReform Commission (NDRC).14 In 2015, the State Administrationof Foreign Exchange also streamlined the review process for foreign exchange approvals, giving local bank branches the authorityto verify exchanges for outbound investments.15 These measuresaim to decentralize investment management and deepen the roleof markets in resource allocation, leading to reduced investmentreview periods and increased outbound flows, particularly for private companies investing in nonstrategic sectors.16 Political uncertainty: Chinese President and General Secretaryof the CCP Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign began in 2013,and has spurred capital outflows as many Chinese officials andbusinesspeople move their wealth abroad in hopes of avoidinggovernment scrutiny and having their assets seized.17 According to China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, inthe first half of 2017 more than 210,000 Chinese officials werepunished for corruption.†* For more information on China’s 13th Five-Year Plan and related state plans and their targets, see Katherine Koleski, “The 13th Five-Year Plan,” U.S.-China Economic and Security ReviewCommission, February 14, 2017.† Among those convicted of graft and other corruption charges were eight provincial and ministerial officials in June 2017, whose sentences included terms of up to life in prison. Xinhua,
77More recently, the Chinese government is attempting to limit capital outflows and fend off risks from mounting corporate debt, making it unlikely Chinese FDI in 2017 will reach 2016 levels.18 In thefinal months of 2016, FDI flows became more restricted as Chineseregulators began cracking down on “irrational” FDI outflows (or investments that do not support government objectives) and rampingup measures to stem capital outflows amid fears of capital flight.19Government measures to limit investments include: Capital controls: In November 2016, Reuters reported China’sState Administration of Foreign Exchange had begun reviewingcapital transfers abroad worth 5 million or more and would beincreasing scrutiny of all outbound deals as well as re-reviewingdeals that already received government approval.20 Reviews of large overseas deals: In the first half of 2017, Chinesebanking regulators began increasing regulatory scrutiny of dealsby large overseas investors like Anbang Insurance Group, HNAGroup, and Dalian Wanda Group as part of a government effort tolimit capital outflows and fend off risks from mounting corporatedebt.21 New regulations include barring state-owned banks frommaking loans to large private firms investing overseas, a decisionthat was approved in June 2017 by President Xi.22 The ChinaBanking Regulatory Commission is also taking the lead on investigating whether certain companies used high-interest financialproducts and overseas loans to finance foreign deals.23 Restrictions on extralegal forms of financing: Since June 2017,Chinese companies that rely on extralegal forms of funding—including high-interest financial products and overseas loans—to finance overseas deals have been temporarily banned fromselling new products and are undergoing reviews of their pastfinancial filings and records of past deals. The ban came afterChinese firms like Wanda, Fosun, HNA Group, and Anbang increased their investments abroad using offshore financing andmoney raised by issuing financial products that are not controlled by the Chinese government.24 In response to the newpolicy, Wanda’s founder Wang Jianlin has pursued what he describes as an “asset-light” strategy, selling off properties thatrequire loans to operate; in June 2017, Wanda sold off 13 of itsChina theme parks to the real estate firm Sunac China for 6.5billion and 77 of its hotels to the Chinese property developerR&F Properties for 3 billion.25 Crackdown on “irrational” investments: In August 2017, China’sState Council announced new policies to discourage what it refers to as “irrational” foreign investments.26 According to theNDRC, some Chinese firms were pursuing imprudent foreigndeals that resulted in significant financial losses and did not advance Chinese government objectives.27 To crack down on thesepractices, the Chinese government divided outbound investmentinto three categories—encouraged, restricted, and banned.28Encouraged investments include deals that promote the One“China Focus: Conviction of 8 ‘Big Tigers’ Heralds Prolonged Anti-Graft Fight,” June 1, 2017;Xinhua, “210,000 Officials Punished for Discipline Violations in H1,” July 20, 2017.
78Belt, One Road initiative, export excess domestic production capacity, and build up China’s technology and innovation capacity.These deals will receive government support, including accelerated regulatory review processes and financial support fromstate banks. Restricted investments—such as deals in real estate, hotels, entertainment, and professional sports teams—willbe subject to closer government scrutiny, and may be rejected ordelayed indefinitely under the new guidelines.29 Banned investments, meanwhile, are those that may impede China’s nationalinterest and national security, including deals seeking to exportcore technologies.30 Deals that that do not fall into these categories will be subject to normal regulatory review processes.31Trends in Chinese InvestmentIn 2016, acquisitions accounted for 96 percent of Chinese investment in the United States by value.32 Meanwhile, capital-intensivegreenfield investments—including manufacturing plants, real estatedevelopments, and R&D-intensive projects—accounted for only 4percent of all U.S.-bound Chinese investments in 2016.33 This trendcontinued in the first half of 2017, with acquisitions comprising97.6 percent of the total value of Chinese investment in the UnitedStates.34As seen in Table 1, Chinese FDI in 2016 primarily targeted U.S.real estate, consumer products and services, and transportation,with combined investments in these sectors accounting for nearly63 percent of China’s total 2016 FDI in the United States.35 Between 2010 and 2016, Chinese investment in these three sectorscombined increased by nearly 27 billion.36 In the first half of 2017,the leading targets of Chinese investment included U.S. transportation ( 10.4 billion), real estate ( 10.3 billion), and biotechnology ( 1billion).37Table 1: Chinese FDI Flows to the United States by Sector, 2010 and 2016(US billions)Sector20102016Real Estate & Hospitality0.2217.33Transportation0.046.04Consumer Products & n and Communication 6.2EntertainmentTotalSource: Rhodium Group, “China Investment Monitor.” .
79According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, China accounted for 7.4 percent of U.S. investment inflows in 2016, makingit the fifth largest source of FDI behind Canada (15.6 percent), theUnited Kingdom (14.6 percent), Ireland (9.5 percent), and Switzerland (9.3 percent).38 Many Chinese investments in the UnitedStates have come in the form of multimillion-dollar deals (see Table2), some of which warrant close scrutiny by U.S. regulators becauseof the CCP’s central role in Chinese firms’ foreign investment decisions and the potential national security risks posed. Several ofthese large Chinese acquisitions have drawn congressional attention, with lawmakers urging caution over Chinese bids for LatticeSemiconductor, Legendary Entertainment, and Syngenta AG, amongothers.39Table 2: Chinese Investments in the United States of 1 Billion or More,Jan. 2016–Jun. 2017ChineseBuyerU.S. TargetPrice(US billions)StatusIndustryDalian WandaLegendaryEntertainment 3.5Deal closed,Mar. 2016EntertainmentZhuhai SeineTechnologyLexmark(70% stake) 3.4Deal closed,Apr. 2016Electronicsand ITHaier GroupGeneral Electricappliance division 5.4Deal closed,Jun. 2016Home appliancesDidi ChuxingUber (2% stake) 1.0Deal closed,Aug. 2016TransportationOrientSecuritiesAppLovin 1.4Deal closed,Sept. 2016Electronicsand ITAnbangBlackstone GroupStrategic Hotels &Resorts Inc. 5.7Deal closed,Oct. 2016Real estateHNAHilton Worldwide(25% stake) 6.5Deal closed,Oct. 2016Real estateHNACarlson Hotels 2.0Deal closed,Dec. 2016Real estateHNAIngram Micro 6.0Deal closed,Dec. 2016Electronicsand ITChian Investment Corp.Invesco 1.0Deal closed,Dec. 2016Real estateTencentTesla (5% stake) 1.8Deal closed,Mar. 2017TransportationHNA245 Park Avenue 1.6Deal closed,Mar. 2017Real estateHNACIT Group 10.4Deal closed,Apr. 2017TransportationZhongwang USALLCAleris Corp. 2.3Pending,agreed toacquire Aug.2016Aluminum
80Table 2: Chinese Investments in the United States of 1 Billion or More,Jan. 2016–Jun. 2017—ContinuedChineseBuyerU.S. TargetPrice(US billions)StatusIndustryOceanwideHoldingsGenworth Financial 2.7Pending,agreed toacquire inOct. 2016InsuranceSource: Various.40Chinese Investment by OwnershipThe Chinese government maintains significant influence over private firms’ investment decisions—including encouraging, modifying,or banning deals based on the specific industries, geographies, andtechnologies involved—by utilizing a mix of financial incentives, political arrangements, and agreements among company shareholders.41 Through these measures, the CCP maintains influence overthe activities of public and private firms alike, offering direct andindirect subsidies and other incentives to influence business decisions and achieve state goals.* As Rhodium Group’s director Thilo Hanemann testified to the Commission, “the notion of a privateenterprise is a very different concept in China. . . . I do believe thatwe should assume that any company, whether it’s nominally stateowned or private, can be influenced and to some extent controlled bythe Chinese government and ultimately by the Communist Party.” 42SOEs previously accounted for the majority of Chinese FDI flowsto the United States, making up 58 percent of annual Chinese investment in the United States as recently as 2011.43 By 2016, thatshare was down to 21 percent, with private companies (defined byRhodium Group as companies with less than 20 percent state ownership) becoming the leading source of Chinese FDI in the UnitedStates.44 This reflected a global trend as private Chinese companiesincreased their outbound investment due to the growth of the private sector in China, rising uncertainty over the future investmentreturn of Chinese assets, concern for the future political climate inChina, and the easing of policies limiting investment outflows.45This trend continued in the first half of 2017, with Chinese companies that call themselves privately owned accounting for 98.4 percent of Chinese investment in the United States.46Although the Chinese government’s influence extends to all sectorsof the economy, Beijing is primarily focused on firms operating in strategic sectors that advance the government’s political and economicinterests (for more on China’s industrial and technology developmentpolicies, see Chapter 4, Section 1, “China’s Pursuit of Dominance inComputing, Robotics, and Biotechnology”).47 Along with investment inU.S. real estate, sectors of the U.S. economy that serve a strategic purpose for the CCP are more likely to be targeted by the Chinese government for investment, with Beijing exercising its influence to coordinateinvestment efforts in both the private and public sectors.48* For more on the role of SOEs in China’s economy, see U.S.-China Economic and SecurityReview Commission, Chapter 1, Section 2, “State-Owned Enterprises, Overcapacity, and China’sMarket Economy Status,” in 2016 Annual Report to Congress, November 2016, 92–103.
81U.S. Reviews of Chinese InvestmentWith Chinese FDI flows to the United States on the rise, reviewsof foreign investment have become an increasingly important toolfor safeguarding U.S. national security interests. The Committee onForeign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is the primarygovernment body tasked with reviewing any merger, acquisition, ortakeover that would result in “foreign control of any person engagedin interstate commerce in the United States.” 49 CFIUS, an executiveinteragency committee chaired by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, determines whether a covered * foreign investment transaction(1) poses a threat to the national security of the United States; (2)involves a foreign entity controlled by a foreign government; or (3)would result in control of any critical infrastructure that could harmU.S. national security interests. If a determination has been madethat an acquisition jeopardizes national security, the transaction canbe exempted from review only by the Secretary of the Treasury, inconcert with any other specified officials relevant to the investigation.50CFIUS comprises nine members and two ex officio members,†as well as other secretaries or heads of relevant U.S. agencies appointed by the president for a given investigation. For any coveredtransaction, CFIUS is allotted 30 days to conduct its review and,if necessary, 45 days to conduct an investigation and make a recommendation. During the review period, the Director of NationalIntelligence carries out an analysis of the deal’s national securityimplications in consultation with all affected or relevant intelligenceagencies. After the CFIUS review and investigation period is completed, the president of the United States has 15 days to decidewhether to suspend, make changes to, or prohibit the investment.51There is also an informal review period for an unspecified length oftime prior to the start of the formal review process, which allowsboth the Committee and the firms involved to identify potential issues before the formal review process begins. The review processhas evolved to allow companies to refile with CFIUS if no decisionis reached within this timeframe.52 On occasion, CFIUS membersalso negotiate conditions with firms to mitigate or remove assetsthat raised national security concerns. A single lead agency modifies, monitors, and enforces mitigation agreements to account for thenature of the threat posed by a given transaction.‡The CFIUS process is voluntary, so companies may choose not tofile a transaction with CFIUS even if the deal involves potentialnational security concerns.53 However, CFIUS can also initiate aninvestigation on its own, and can demand that the deal be unwound* Covered transactions are defined as any merger, acquisition, or takeover resulting in “foreigncontrol of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” Defense ProductionAct of 1950 § 721 (Amended by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007), PublicLaw No. 110–49, 2007.† The nine permanent members are the Secretaries of State, Treasu
These investments support the global competitiveness of Chinese firms by allowing them to access capital and technologies not available in their home market. Chinese mergers and acquisi- . Kong SAR, July 17, 2013. 75 Rhodium Group's 2016 Report Highlights Increasing Chinese Investment