No. 21-1047In the Supreme Court of the United StatesANNICK ROY, ET AL., PETITIONERS ,v.CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARITO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE FIRST CIRCUITBRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITIONPAUL J. HEMMINGJOHN R. MCDONALDTAFT STETTINIUS &HOLLISTER LLP2200 IDS Center80 South Eighth StreetMinneapolis, MN 55402(612) [email protected] B. WALLCounsel of RecordMORGAN L. RATNERSULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP1700 New York Avenue, N.W.Suite 700Washington, DC 20006(202) [email protected] F. ROSENBERGSULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP125 Broad StreetNew York, NY 10004(212) 558-4000Counsel for Respondent Canadian Pacific Railway Company

QUESTIONS PRESENTED1. Whether the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure govern procedure in a civil proceeding that hasbeen transferred to a federal district court under28 U.S.C. 157(b)(5) by virtue of being related to abankruptcy case under 28 U.S.C. 1334(b).2. Whether Bankruptcy Rule 9023 governs thedeadline to file a post-judgment motion entered in abankruptcy proceeding over which the federal districtcourt has related-to bankruptcy jurisdiction under28 U.S.C. 1334(b).(I)

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTRespondent Canadian Pacific Railway Company isa wholly owned subsidiary of Canadian Pacific Railway Limited. No publicly held company owns 10% ormore of Canadian Pacific Railway Limited’s stock.(II)

TABLE OF CONTENTSPageOpinions below . 1Jurisdiction . 1Statement . 1Argument . 7A. The first question presented does not warrantreview. 8B. The second question presented does notwarrant review . 19Conclusion . 21TABLE OF AUTHORITIESPage(s)Cases:Bli Farms, P’ship, In re,465 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2006) . 19, 21Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank,575 U.S. 496 (2015) . 11Butler, Inc., In re,2 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1993). 20Celotex Corp., In re,124 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 1997) . 14, 15Celotex Corp. v. Edwards,514 U.S. 300 (1995) . 9(III)

IVCases—continued:Diamond Mortg. Corp. of Ill. v. Sugar,913 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1990) . 14, 15Double Eagle Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. MarkWestUtica EMG, L.L.C.,936 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2019) . 14English-Speaking Union v. Johnson,353 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2004) . 19Gaudet v. Boyajian,50 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995) . 19General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline,540 U.S. 581 (2004) . 16Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins.Co.,547 U.S. 651 (2006) . 11Moody, In re,817 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1987) . 11Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon PipeLine Co.,458 U.S. 50 (1982) . 15Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand,22 F.3d 1228 (3d Cir. 1994) . 14, 15Reynolds v. Behrman Cap. IV L.P.,988 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2021) . 14Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC,140 S. Ct. 582 (2020) . 11Stern v. Marshall,564 U.S. 462 (2011) . 10

VStatutes and rules:28 U.S.C.157 . 2, 3, 10, 141254 . 11334 . 9, 11, 15, 161452 . 9Fed. R. App. P. 4 . 6Fed. R. Bankr. P.1001 . 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 207001 . 8, 9, 12, 13, 147004 . 4, 14, 16, 187015 . 177042 . 177054 . 179001 . 209023 . 2, 3, 6, 19, 20, 21Fed. R. Civ. P.4 . 1815 . 1742 . 1754 . 1759 . 6, 19, 2081 . 6, 17

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITIONRespondent respectfully submits that the petitionfor a writ of certiorari should be denied.OPINIONS BELOWThe opinion of the court of appeals dismissing petitioners’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction (Pet. App.1a-20a) is reported at 999 F.3d 72. The opinion of thedistrict court granting respondent’s motion to dismissis reported at 210 F. Supp. 3d 218. The opinion of thedistrict court denying petitioners’ motion for leave tofile a second amended complaint (Pet. App. 21a-27a) isnot reported but is available at 2016 WL 5416943.JURISDICTIONThe judgment of the court of appeals was enteredon June 2, 2021. The petition for rehearing was denied on September 8, 2021 (Pet. App. 30a-36a). OnNovember 30, 2021, Justice Breyer extended the timewithin which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari toand including January 24, 2022, and the petition wasfiled on that date. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).STATEMENTIn July 2013, a freight train operated by the Montreal Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA) derailed in thetown of Lac-Mégantic, Quebec. The train was carrying crude oil, and the resulting explosions killed 47people. Their representatives, who are the petitioners here, filed personal-injury and wrongful-death(1)

2suits against MMA and a number of other defendants,eventually including respondent Canadian PacificRailway Company. While some of those suits werepending, MMA filed for bankruptcy in the District ofMaine, and all of the tort and wrongful-death suits(including this one) were transferred to that court under 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(5) as related to MMA’s bankruptcy.On September 28, 2016, the district court dismissed this case based in part on lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The court heldthat Canadian Pacific did not have sufficient, relevantcontacts with the United States and that Quebec—where the derailment occurred and where all of theplaintiffs resided—was a more convenient forum thanMaine. See 210 F. Supp. 3d 218. That same day, thecourt denied petitioners’ motion for leave to file a second amended complaint adding various Canadian Pacific subsidiaries as parties. See Pet. App. 21a-27a.Twenty-eight days later, on October 26, petitionersfiled a motion for reconsideration of the denial ofleave to file a second amended complaint. CanadianPacific responded as relevant here that the reconsideration motion was untimely under Federal Rule ofBankruptcy Procedure 9023, which allows 14 days tofile certain post-judgment motions. The district courtsummarily denied the reconsideration motion. SeePet. App. 29a.On January 19, 2017, petitioners filed a notice ofappeal from the district court’s denial of the motionfor leave to amend. The court of appeals dismissedthe appeal as untimely. See Pet. App. 1a-20a. Thecourt explained that petitioners had appealed long after the 30-day period permitted by Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 4(a)—which expired October 28,

32016—because the reconsideration motion had nottolled that deadline given that it too had been untimely under Bankruptcy Rule 9023. See Pet. App. 20a.The court denied rehearing en banc without noteddissent, id. at 35a-36a, and this petition followed.1. In July 2013, a train operated by MMA derailedin the town of Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, killing 47 people. C.A. J.A. 1136. Shortly thereafter, petitionersfiled dozens of personal-injury and wrongful-deathsuits against MMA and others. In August 2013, thederailment and the litigation caused MMA to file forChapter 11 bankruptcy protection in Maine. Petitioners later sued Canadian Pacific in both Illinois andTexas state courts. Id. at 1136-1137. 1 Canadian Pacific removed all of those cases to federal court. See No.15-mc-00355-JDL (D. Me.), Docket entry No. 37 at 1-3(transfer order detailing procedural history of Illinoisand Texas cases). The parties agreed there was federal “subject-matter jurisdiction over the Illinois andTexas claims because they are ‘related to’ the MMAbankruptcy which is subject to title 11 of the UnitedStates Code.” Id. at 3; see C.A. J.A. 1140 (“[S]ubjectmatter jurisdiction derives from a federal statute, 28U.S.C.A. § 1452(a) (2016), insofar as it is ‘related to’the MMA bankruptcy.”).In February 2016, the district court granted thetransfer motion under 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(5). See No.15-mc-00355-JDL (D. Me.), Docket entry No. 37. Section 157(b)(5) provides in part that a district courtAlthough the Texas suit initially covered property-damageclaims as well as personal-injury and wrongful-death claims, theTexas plaintiffs agreed to abandon their property-damage claims sothat the court could exercise its transfer powers under 28 U.S.C.157(b)(5).1

4having jurisdiction over a bankruptcy proceeding“shall order that personal injury tort and wrongfuldeath claims shall be tried in the district court inwhich the bankruptcy case is pending.” The courtfound that petitioners’ claims against Canadian Pacific were related to MMA’s bankruptcy for two reasons:(1) the confirmed MMA bankruptcy plan includes “a‘proportionate judgment reduction provision’ underwhich Canadian Pacific’s liability for the LacMégantic disaster, if any, may be reduced by thecomparative fault of MMA, which operated the train”;and (2) the bankruptcy estate would need to be involved in determining the comparative fault of MMA,and litigating in a single forum would help conserveestate resources. Id. at 4-5. 2After the transfer, Canadian Pacific moved to dismiss the suits based on lack of personal jurisdiction,insufficiency of service of process, and forum non conveniens. C.A. J.A. 40. In opposing the personaljurisdiction motion, petitioners argued that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, not the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, should apply—and they relied on one of the very cases they now criticize in theirpetition. Specifically, petitioners argued that, “unlikeRule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule7004(d) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy ProcePetitioners incorrectly argue (at 7-8) that related-to jurisdictionwas based solely on a shared insurance policy. In the relevanttransfer order, the district court found that this case is related tothe MMA bankruptcy for reasons other than merely the insurancepolicy. No. 15-mc-00355-JDL (D. Me.), Docket entry No. 37 at 4-5.Petitioners mistakenly rely on an earlier transfer order that predated Canadian Pacific’s involvement in this litigation.2

5dure applies in this removed case (Diamond Mtg.Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d at 1242-43) and that ruleprovides for nationwide jurisdiction.” C.A. J.A. 260.On September 28, 2016, the district court grantedCanadian Pacific’s motion to dismiss. The courtagreed with petitioners that they needed to show only“that the defendant has adequate contacts in theUnited States as a whole, rather than with a particular state.” C.A. J.A. 1140. But the court determinedthat Canadian Pacific lacked such contacts because itis a Canadian company with no relevant presence inthe United States. Id. at 1142-1143. In the alternative, the court found that Canadian Pacific had notbeen properly served with process and that Quebecwas a more appropriate forum. Id. at 1150-1157. Atthe same time it granted the motion to dismiss, thecourt denied petitioners’ motion for leave to file a second amended complaint adding certain Canadian Pacific subsidiaries as defendants. Pet. App. 21a-27a.The court reasoned that the second amended complaint did not contain any “factual allegations” thatwould “support the conclusion that [Canadian Pacific]and its affiliates are in fact a common enterprise.” 25a. Having dismissed petitioners’ claims and denied leave to amend, the court entered judgment. 28a.Twenty-eight days later, on October 26, petitionersfiled what they styled as a motion to reconsider thedenial of leave to file a second amended complaint.C.A. J.A. 1162-1169. That motion, however, did notcontend either that the judgment dismissing Canadian Pacific was incorrect, or that the district court hadwrongly denied the motion for leave to amend. Instead, the motion sought post-judgment permission tofile an entirely new amended complaint that would

6have replaced Canadian Pacific as a defendant andsubstitute one of Canadian Pacific’s subsidiaries. 1170-1191. Canadian Pacific opposed the motion ona number of grounds, including timeliness. Id. at1263-1274. As relevant here, it argued that the Bankruptcy Rules, which allow a 14-day window for motions to alter or amend a judgment, controlled andthat the motion for reconsideration therefore cametoo late. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023. The districtcourt summarily denied petitioners’ reconsiderationmotion. Pet. App. 29a.2. On January 19, 2017, petitioners appealed thedenial of leave to file a second amended complaint,and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for wantof appellate jurisdiction. Pet. App. 1a-20a. Petitioners had filed their notice of appeal more than 30 daysafter the district court had entered judgment on September 28, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), and so theirappeal was timely only if the October 26 reconsideration motion had tolled the 30-day deadline. That postjudgment motion, in turn, tolled the deadline only if itwas timely filed. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). CivilRule 81(a)(2) states that the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure apply in bankruptcy cases “to the extentprovided by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2). And Bankruptcy Rule9023 adopts Civil Rule 59 in the bankruptcy contextbut shortens the time for filing certain post-judgmentmotions from 28 to 14 days. Although petitioners’ reconsideration motion was filed within 28 days, it wasnot filed within 14 days. Thus, if Bankruptcy Rule9023 governed in this case, then petitioners’ reconsideration motion was untimely and did not toll their appeal period. Pet. App. 3a. The appeal itself wouldthen have been untimely as well. Ibid.

7The court of appeals held that the BankruptcyRules apply to non-core, related-to proceedings likethis case. The court first observed that “all three ofthe courts of appeals to have considered the issuehave concluded that the Bankruptcy Rules apply to anon-core, ‘related to’ case pending in a federal forum.”Pet. App. 11a. The court then examined the languageof the Bankruptcy Rules for itself, and found it“strongly suggest[ive] that the procedural aspects ofnon-core, ‘related to’ cases adjudicated in federal district courts are governed by the Bankruptcy Rules.”Id. at 14a. That suggestion is supported, the courtfurther explained, by “the practicalities attendant tothe efficient operation of the modern bankruptcy system.” Ibid. In particular, it would not make sense forthe federal district court overseeing a bankruptcy toapply two different sets of rules to matters within orrelated to the bankruptcy. Id. at 14a-15a. Given theuniform decisions from its sister circuits, the agreement of the leading bankruptcy treatise, and the factthat petitioners had themselves requested transfer ofthis case to the District of Maine on related-togrounds, the court of appeals concluded that petitioners’ “notice-based concerns ring hollow.” Id. at 19a.ARGUMENTCongress provided that, when a bankruptcy petition is filed in federal court, related proceedings mayalso be filed in or removed to the same federal court.Petitioners’ primary contention (Pet. 12-25) is that theFederal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure apply to onlythe original bankruptcy case, not any related proceedings pending before the same district court. Thethree other courts of appeals to directly consider thatargument—the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits—

8have rejected it as inconsistent with the language ofthe Bankruptcy Rules and sound bankruptcy policy.And at least two other courts of appeals—the Fifthand Eleventh Circuits—have acknowledged that theBankruptcy Rules apply to related-to proceedings.No court of appeals has concluded otherwise. Petitioners are thus mistaken that there is a circuit split(Pet. 12-17) or that chaos looms in the lower courts(Pet. 17-21). Moreover, petitioners affirmatively argued for application of the Bankruptcy Rules beforethe district court, making this case an exceptionallypoor vehicle given that petitioners effectively invitedany error.Petitioners also briefly contend (Pet. 25-27) thateven if the Bankruptcy Rules govern, the court of appeals applied the wrong rule in determining the timeliness of their reconsideration motion. Again, the decision below is both correct and not the subject of anysplit. Further review is not warranted.A. The First Question Presented Does NotWarrant ReviewPetitioners do not dispute that, if the BankruptcyRules governed the reconsideration motion they filedin district court, that motion was untimely. The motion therefore would not toll the deadline for filing anappeal, which would be similarly untimely. The question then is whether, as the lower courts held, theBankruptcy Rules apply to this case. They do. Thetext and history of Bankruptcy Rules 1001 and 7001require that result, as every court of appeals to address the issue has agreed. And even if the issue otherwise warranted review, petitioners affirmatively argued before the district court for application of the

9Bankruptcy Rules, making this case a poor one forconsidering their supposed notice concerns.1. Federal courts’ bankruptcy jurisdiction is quitebroad. Section 1334(a) of Title 28 provides that federal district courts “shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.” As petitionersnote (at 12-13), that provision grants exclusive federaljurisdiction over a bankruptcy petition itself. Section1334(b) then provides that district courts “shall haveoriginal but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or relatedto cases under title 11.” This Court has explainedthat civil proceedings that “could conceivably haveany effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy” are “related to cases under title 11” for purposes of Section 1334(b). Celotex Corp. v. Edwards,514 U.S. 300, 307, 308 n.6 (1995). Congress chose expansive language in order to grant “comprehensivebankruptcy jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts sothat they might deal efficiently and expeditiously withall matters connected with the bankruptcy estate.”Id. at 308.Because federal courts do not have exclusive original jurisdiction over related-to proceedings, Congressprovided a mechanism for removal from state court tofederal court. See 28 U.S.C. 1452(a). After removal(and, if necessary, transfer), the removed matter becomes an “adversary proceeding” in the bankruptcycase. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(10) (defining “adversary proceeding” to include “a proceeding to determine a claim or cause of action removed under28 U.S.C. § 1452”). Here, petitioners brought a number of wrongful-death suits against various defendants in both Illinois and Texas state courts. Thosesuits were removed to federal court and eventually

10transferred to the Maine federal district court whereMMA’s bankruptcy was pending. See 210 F. Supp. 3d218, 222.In general, “[d]istrict courts may refer any or all[bankruptcy] proceedings to the bankruptcy judges oftheir district.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 473(2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. 157(a)). “The manner inwhich a bankruptcy judge may act on a referred matter depends on the type of proceeding involved.” Ibid.A bankruptcy judge may hear and enter final judgments in core bankruptcy proceedings, see id. at 474(quoting 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(1)), and those judgmentsare reviewed by the district court under “traditionalappellate standards,” id. at 475. When, however, “areferred ‘proceeding . . . is not a core proceeding but. . . is otherwise related to a case under title 11,’” thebankruptcy judge may only submit a recommendationthat the district court reviews de novo. Ibid. (quoting28 U.S.C. 157(c)(1)). Congress drew certain exceptions to the core/non-core scheme, among them that“personal injury tort and wrongful death claims” mustbe tried by the district court. 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(5).Accordingly, the Maine district court here did not refer, but addressed itself, petitioners’ wrongful-deathclaims against Canadian Pacific.2. Petitioners contend that in adjudicating theirclaims, the district court was required to apply theFederal Rules of Civil Procedure, not the FederalRules of Bankruptcy Procedure. As petitioners see it,the Bankruptcy Rules govern the bankruptcy case itself, whereas the Civil Rules govern related-to proceedings like this case. As explained below, that is anewfound position for petitioners. See infra at 16-18.In any event, it is incorrect. When proceedings areconsolidated in a single federal court as related to a

11bankruptcy under Section 1334(b), there is no textualor common-sense basis for applying different procedural rules than to the bankruptcy itself.a. The court of appeals correctly began with thetext of Bankruptcy Rule 1001, which establishes thescope of the Bankruptcy Rules and provides that they“govern procedure in cases under title 11 of the United States Code.” That language does not refer to cases arising under Title 11—i.e., bankruptcy petitionsthemselves and perhaps core related-to proceedings.See Pet. App. 12a (“Rule 1001 omits the word ‘arising.’”). Rather, Rule 1001 refers broadly to “casesunder title 11,” which naturally encompasses all proceedings in federal court by virtue of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. As it is used in Rule 1001, a“case[] under title 11” is “the umbrella under whichall other matters take place.” In re Moody, 817 F.2d365, 367 (5th Cir. 1987). It includes under its canopyall bankruptcy proceedings that comprise sub-actionsin such a case, even non-core proceedings like this onethat are tried before a district court while exercisingits related-to bankruptcy jurisdiction.In the bankruptcy context, this Court has used theterm “case” to refer broadly to proceedings litigatedin connection with a federal bankruptcy. The Courtrecently observed that “[a] bankruptcy case embraces‘an aggregation of individual controversies.’ ” RitzenGrp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582,586 (2020) (quoting 1 Collier on Bankruptcy¶ 5.08[1][b], p. 5-43 (16th ed. 2019)). And “Congresshas long provided that orders in bankruptcy casesmay be immediately appealed if they finally dispose ofdiscrete disputes within the larger case.” Bullard v.Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015) (quotingHoward Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,

12547 U.S. 651, 657 n.3 (2006)). The Court’s languagereflects a common usage and understanding in bankruptcy, which is that a case under Title 11 is not merely the bankruptcy petition that “arises” under Title11. The larger bankruptcy case may include manydiscrete and related proceedings.The last sentence of Rule 1001 confirms a broadreading of the term “case” in Rule 1001’s first sentence. The last sentence provides: “These rules shallbe construed, administered, and employed by thecourt and the parties to secure the just, speedy, andinexpensive determination of every case and proceeding” (emphasis added). That wording is critical fortwo reasons. First, it shows that the earlier referencein Rule 1001 to “cases under title 11” cannot mean only the bankruptcy petition itself—because Rule 1001immediately gives general instructions on how theRules are to be applied in “every case and proceeding.” Second, when Rule 1001 refers to “every . . .proceeding,” that language plainly encompasses adversary proceedings like this case.The Advisory Committee Notes are to the same effect: they say that the Bankruptcy Rules are “applicable to cases and proceedings under title 11,” and“the civil rules do not apply to proceedings in bankruptcy, except as they may be made applicable byrules promulgated by [this] Court.” Fed. R. Bankr. P.7001 advisory committee note (emphases added).Both Rule 1001’s complete text and the accompanyingNotes make clear that the Bankruptcy Rules applybeyond the specific case commenced by the filing of abankruptcy petition and encompass related proceedings that are part of the same overall bankruptcy.Indeed, there is an air of unreality to petitioners’argument. The Bankruptcy Rules are quite compre-

13hensive, covering everything from the bankruptcycase commenced by the filing of a petition (Part I), toadversary proceedings that are either filed within thebankruptcy case or that are brought into it by removal (Part VII). Part VII contains more than fifty Rulesthat span pleading, discovery, and judgment. It begins with Rule 7001, which states that “[a]n adversaryproceeding is governed by the rules of this Part VII.”It then lists the types of adversary proceedings, including “a proceeding to determine a claim or cause ofaction removed under 28 U.S.C. §1452.” Fed. R.Bankr. P. 7001(10). As the district court’s dismissalorder stated, “subject matter jurisdiction derivesfrom a federal statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1452(a) (2016),insofar as it is ‘related to’ the MMA bankruptcy.”C.A. J.A. 1140. Petitioners’ position is thus thatalthough Rule 7001 (and with it Part VII) by its termsapplies to petitioners’ litigation against Canadian Pacific, that is trumped by the phrase “cases under title11” in Rule 1001. But courts should favor a construction of the term “case” in the first sentence of Rule1001 that would not nullify Rule 7001 and Part VII’sapplication to adversary proceedings more generally.And in any event, if there were an irreconcilable conflict, the specific language in Rule 7001 would controlthe more general language in Rule 1001.b. In addition to Rule 1001’s text, the court of appeals also considered “the efficiency goals of thebankruptcy system.” Pet. App. 15a. As that court explained, Congress created a system in which relatedproceedings could be removed or transferred to thesame federal district court overseeing the bankruptcy. It would not make any sense for the district courtto apply the Bankruptcy Rules to the case commencedby the bankruptcy petition, but the Civil Rules to re-

14lated proceedings—which, after all, may be in federalcourt only by virtue of their connection to the bankruptcy. Employing petitioners’ approach that Rule1001 is limited to cases “arising” under Title 11, theCivil Rules would apply to all related-to proceedings,even core proceedings—meaning that the Civil Ruleswould apply whenever a bankruptcy judge adjudicated traditional bankruptcy matters in a core related-toproceeding. See 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(2) (listing core proceedings).To forestall that impracticable result, petitionerssuggest, but do not clearly state, that the BankruptcyRules would apply not just in the specific case commenced by the bankruptcy petition but also in coreproceedings. See, e.g., Pet. 22-23. But “[n]othing inthe literal terms of the pertinent rules—and, in particular, nothing in Rules 1001, 7001 or 7004(d)—evenremotely suggests that they are to be applied differently in core and non-core proceedings.” DiamondMortg. Corp. of Ill. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1243 (7thCir. 1990). Indeed, as far as Canadian Pacific isaware, no court has ever accepted that position.3. As petitioners acknowledge (at 2, 11), the onlyother three courts of appeals to consider their argument have rejected it. See Pet. App. 11a; see also Inre Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 629 (4th Cir. 1997);Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228,1237 (3d Cir. 1994); Diamond Mortg., 913 F.2d at1242. Consistent with those decisions, two additionalcourts of appeals have recently concluded, thoughwithout extensive analysis, that the Bankruptcy Rulesapply in related-to proceedings. See Reynolds v.Behrman Cap. IV L.P., 988 F.3d 1314, 1323-1325(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 239 (2021); DoubleEagle Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. MarkWest Utica

15EMG, L.L.C., 936 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2019). Nocourt of appeals has concluded otherwise.As the Fourth Circuit held in Celotex, when a proceeding “is properly in federal district court on ‘related to’ jurisdiction under § 1334(b),” then “[t]he entirebody of Bankruptcy Rules . . . applies to [the] action.”124 F.3d at 629. The Third Circuit gave a historicalreason in addition to Rule 1001’s current text: “Before 1987, Bankruptcy Rule 1001, which def

1700 New York Avenue, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 956-7660 [email protected] MARK F. ROSENBERG SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 . Mortg. Corp. of Ill. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1243 (7th Cir. 1990). Indeed, as far as Canadian Pacific is aware, no cou