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week class, graduating over 16,000 officers from twenty-seven Special and General Staff Classes.Following the war’s end, the Army established a Military Education Board to design a postwareducation system for the Army. 6 While this board played a significant role in the future of FortLeavenworth, it was not the first or last revision of instruction at the school. However, this boardbegan a trend in the school, transitioning a curriculum based on tactical excellence, to oneattempting to balance strategic education with tactical instruction.Since its opening day, the curriculum at Fort Leavenworth underwent numerous changes.These curricula revisions occurred for a variety of reasons, including advances in technology,changes in warfare and doctrine, and changes in philosophies of instruction.7 Selection standardsfor officers to attend training at Fort Leavenworth and for the selection as instructors at theschool, also varied as Army requirements changed. Over its 130-year history, these changes incurriculum, philosophies of instruction, and the selection of students and instructors, haveaffected the quality of Leavenworth graduates and the education they received.Today, the schools at Fort Leavenworth are subordinate to the U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College (CGSC). 8 Under CGSC, there are four learning institutions, with theCommand and General Staff School responsible for conducting the Intermediate Level Education(ILE) course for mid-grade officers, normally majors, at Fort Leavenworth or at one of fourgrammar). In both classes responses were by recitation to test students oral skill in verbal orders. US ArmyCommand and General Staff School. A Military History of the US Army Command and General StaffCollege 1881-1963 (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1963), 3-4. General Taylor,class of 1935, General Patton, class of 1924, General Eisenhower, class of 1926.6Ibid., 45-46, 48-49.7Robert Griffith, “The Postwar School: A New Era,” in A Brief History of the US Army Commandand General Staff College 1881-1981 (Fort Leavenworth: CSI Press, 1981), 33-35.8Through its 130-year history, the “school” at Fort Leavenworth was renamed several times.Currently CGSC overseas instruction conducted by the Command and General Staff School (CGSS).However, the school has been known as CGSC, CGSOC, CGSS, and the Staff College, among other terms.In this monograph, the school’s name during a particular era or the term “college” or “school” is used.2

satellite locations.9 The transition to ILE is the school’s most recent and perhaps the mostdramatic change in the history of education for the Army officer corps. The concept of ILE is toprovide every mid-grade officer with a common core of operational instruction, and then providean additional, tailored education, as required by the officer’s branch. The intent of ILE is toprepare all majors for their next ten years of service. 10 The change to 100 percent residentattendance was a significant shift in Army policy. Following World War II, Department of theArmy boards centrally selected only fifty percent of majors to attend resident instruction. Thissystem developed a perception “haves” and “have-nots” within the officer corps, with thosemajors not selected for resident Leavenworth attendance required to complete instruction bycorrespondence courses before becoming competitive for their next promotion.11 During a 2003interview, Colonel Mike Griswold, the special assistant for Leader Development to the CGSCCommandant stated, the ILE program “will produce field grade officers with a warrior ethos whoare grounded in warfighting doctrine, and who have the technical, tactical, and leadershipcompetencies and skill to be successful in their career field.”12Fully implemented during the 2005-2006 school year, ILE has not lived up to itsexpectation of 100 percent attendance. Due to the ongoing war, attendance remains at roughlyseventy-six percent of capacity, with only 1,390 of 1,792 seats available filled in the 2011-2012school year. 13 Based on this change, some question the quality of the ILE graduate today. Since9The four schools subordinate to CGSC include the Command and General Staff School (CGSS),The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), School of Command Preparation (SCP) and the Schoolof Advanced Leadership and Tactics (SALT). United States Combined Arms Center, “The Command andGeneral Staff School.” http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/cgss/index.asp (accessed December 10, 2011).10Marcia Triggs, “Army to Transform Officer Education 3/a20030204ile.html (accessed 3 April, 2003).11David Bresser, “Sustainability of Universal ILE” (Monograph, School of Advanced MilitaryStudies, Command and General Staff College, 2007), 2.1213Triggs, “Army to Transform Officer System.”“CGSC Resident ILE / JPME Phase I Student and Faculty Comparison,” US Command andGeneral Staff College, September 20113

1946, the school slowly shifted from a curriculum known for rigor and tough standards to aschool year of “relatively stress-free down time, allowing officers to decompress” and “reflect onprevious combat experiences in a stress reduced environment.” 14 This change in the instructionalphilosophy of rigor was highlighted by a recent doctoral dissertation stating that following theend of the Second World War, “commandants, faculty, and civilian experts never succeeded inre-establishing the rigorous academic environment experienced by interwar students.15 Thisdifference in rigor and a change in the philosophy of teaching is considered as this monographdevelops comparison criteria to compare pre-World War II instruction and ILE instruction.Monograph Thesis and CriteriaThe thesis of this monograph is that the pre-World War II CGSS curriculum betterdeveloped its graduates to execute tactical tasks at the battalion, brigade, and division level thanthe postwar CGSC curriculum, specifically, the ILE curriculum in effect today. This monographwill show that there are divergent teaching philosophies and objectives between the two periodsof instruction, which has resulted in a different level of tactical expertise of the Leavenworthgraduate. Not possible within the scope of this monograph is an hour-by-hour assessment ofclassroom instruction or analysis of each class taught. Instead, four criteria compare two selectederas of instruction at Fort Leavenworth.The four criteria explore if there is a quantifiable difference in the quality of tacticalinstruction of pre-World War II CGSS graduate over today’s ILE graduate. The rationale ofselecting these two periods for comparison (interwar period, focused on the 1930-1939 timeframeand postwar instruction, focused on the 2003-2010 ILE program) is based on the similarities of14Thomas Hollis, “ILE a Casualty of War” (Monograph, Advanced Operations Arts StudiesFellowship, Command and General Staff College, 2008), 25-26.15Michael Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army, Officer Education at the U.S. Army Commandand General Staff College, 1946-1986” (PhD Diss., University of Kansas, 2010), 7.4

the two eras in history of Leavenworth. Both periods underwent a major shift in curriculum andwere influenced by either a looming, or an ongoing war. However, both changes were initiatedprior to the beginning of conflict. The decision to shorten the two-year curriculum to one year inthe 1935 resulted from an increased demand for graduates for general staff assignments in anexpanding Army. While many civilian and military leaders foresaw the coming of the SecondWorld War, the reorganization of the curriculum was not a result of an ongoing conflict. 16 Therevision of CGSC to the ILE curriculum was directed in the findings of The Army Training andLeader Development Panel (ATLDP) officer study, published in May 2001, prior to theSeptember attacks that began the current War on Terror. 17Clearly impossible is an objective comparison of a mid-1930’s CGSS graduate to aTwenty-First Century ILE graduate. Education and experience of students, as well as the worldsituation of the two periods, would flaw any graduate-to-graduate comparison. The criteriaselected allow a subjective look at the instruction at Fort Leavenworth and suggest areas tomodify or continue within the current ILE curriculum. The first criterion looks at how the Armydetermines who will attend Fort Leavenworth as a student. The difference in an incomingstudent’s perception of the course is also apparent within the two periods. The second criterion,important in any educational environment, is the quality of instructor. The monograph willcontrast the differences in selection of instructors and the difference in perception of professionaldevelopment and rewards that an instructor could expect by serving at Fort Leavenworth incomparing the two eras of instruction.16In the mid-1930s, CGSC attendance was by shifting to junior officers (opened to select captainsand First Lieutenants) who were not expected to reach higher levels of command in the coming war, butwho were expected to staffs headquarters in the coming comflict. Hunt and Lorence, History of FortLeavenworth 1827-1937, 159; A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College1881-1963, 30.17US Army News Release, “Changes Approved to Officer Education 3/r20030204r-03-007.html. (accessed 3 April, 2003).5

The third criterion is the mission of the school during the two eras. In the prewar period,tactical training and evaluation dominated every aspect of the curriculum. The mission of theschool during this era was to train future commanders and general staff officers grounded intactics, logistics, and general staff principles. While the ILE teaching mission is similar to theinterwar period, focused on leadership, decision-making, logistics, planning, and operations, thecurriculum minimizes tactical instruction, focusing on the challenges of joint, interagency, andmultinational issues.The fourth criterion, philosophy of instruction, shows a clear difference in both topics ofinstruction and grading. Student grading during the prewar period, evaluated rote memorizationof a school solution in solving graded map-based tactical exercises. Over the course ofinstruction, students progressed from regiment, division, corps and eventually army levelproblems. 18 The ILE curriculum takes a steep departure from this educational philosophy. Theskills trained in ILE (examples being creative thinking and problem solving) are less tangible andmore subjective, as are student evaluations. The ILE curriculum is designed to teach students howto think, not what to think. The teaching methodology emphasizes critical reasoning, creativethinking, and complex problem-solving techniques. 19 There is no school solution to evaluate astudent’s performance as in the interwar era. An additional difference addressed in thismonograph under this criterion is the reduced number and type of exercises from the interwarcourse to the ILE course. These four criteria provide a subjective measure to compare theinstruction for the two periods selected.18Boyd Dastrup, The US Army Command and General Staff College: A Centennial History(Manhattan: Sunflower University Press, 1982), 74-75.19Warner, Volney and James Willbanks, “Preparing Field Grade Leaders for Today andTomorrow,” Military Review 86, no. 1 (January-February 2006), 107.6

Monograph LayoutThe next two sections of the monograph give a historical perspective of the two periodsof education selected for analysis. Section 2 provides an overview of the first 65 years of the FortLeavenworth schools, showing how its early beginnings influenced post-World War I instruction.This section highlights the changes in instructional methods, illustrating how the school evolvedto train officers for World War II service. Closed in 1916 to meet personnel requirements for theMexican Board campaign, Fort Leavenworth reopened in 1919, reestablishing a curriculum usingthe applicatory method of instruction.20 Using the applicatory method, classroom instructionfocused on problem solving using map exercises, maneuvers, and war games. Outside theclassroom, staff rides reinforced principles of warfare studied earlier. 21 This style of instructionremained relatively unchanged throughout the interwar period, influenced only by changes incourse length, with classed reduced to one year between 1923-1928 and 1935-1940. The 19401945 period, while important in the training of staff officers of new divisions and corps during thewar, is covered only to establish a point of departure for the next section.Section 3 provides an overview of the staff college from the resumption of a one-yearcourse in 1946, through the full adoption of the ILE curriculum (2004-20110. Renamed TheCommand and General Staff College in 1946, changes in instruction occurred during the tenureof nearly every commandant. Important in the analysis of this era was the shift in the philosophyof instruction that occurred from training officers to one that educates officers. Over the 57-yearsprior to the adoption of ILE, civilian academic professionals entered the faculty of the College,influencing Leavenworth instruction and introducing a collegiate approach to mid-grade officereducation. The number of civilian faculty also changed the dynamic of instruction, with a mix of720A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963, 20, 22.21Dastrup, A Centennial History, 64.

military and civilian teaching teams. This section concludes with an overview of ILE and itseducation of the current population of mid-grade officer.Section 4 compares the two instructional eras using the four criteria addressed above.Differences, highlighted in the two previous sections, show why the College’s education shiftedfrom a pure command and tactical-staff focus, to a larger aperture covering areas from strategy tointeragency coordination. This section highlights the postwar reduction in tactical instruction andthe shift to a broad generalist education.Section 5 concludes the paper with recommendations to modify the ILE curriculum.While the commander in the field clearly ideally desires a well-rounded officer who is tacticallyproficient and grounded in current doctrine, following pages show that the ILE curriculumreduced tactical training at the expense of educational topics. Section 5 recommends changes instudent selection allowing for increased class rigor, increased instructor selection criteria, and areturn to tactical instruction at the battalion and brigade level to prepare field grade officers fortactical duties immediately following graduation.Scope and RepudiationIn order to narrow the scope of the monograph, several areas of research and discussionwere purposely limited. This monograph uses the supposition that the Fort Leavenworth interwareducation provided a solid basis for US success in World War II; counterarguments to thissupposition are not addressed below. 22 Due to its 100-year plus history, the monograph does nothighlight every change of commandant or the impact of every College and Department of the22Martin Blumenson and a recent book by Jogr Muth both dispute the quality of educationprovided by Fort Leavenworth during the interwar years. See Martin Blumenson, “America's World War IILeaders In Europe; Some Thoughts,” Parameters 19, no. 4 (December 1989), 2-13 and Jorg Muth,Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and theConsequences of World War II (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2011).8

Army board or study. However, major modifications are highlighted as they influencedinstructional changes at Fort Leavenworth. Although significant in the development of theplanners in the Army, the establishment of the School of Advanced Military Studies and otherschools within the CGSC structure are not addressed in detail in the monograph due to theircoverage in other studies. The impact of Vietnam on the Army and the Goldwater-Nichols Act’smodification of military education are not the focus of the monograph and are referenced only asthey influenced specific Fort Leavenworth curricular areas. Statistics for various academic yearsare highlighted through the monograph for reference and comparison, but not annually due to alack of data, redundancy of certain years, and length requirements. Two other components of FortLeavenworth, reserve, non-resident education and participation of international students in theCollege are not addressed due to criteria selected.A final narrowing factor in this monograph is that it does not evaluate current ILEinstruction against the “levels of learning achievement” as defined by Officer ProfessionalMilitary Education Policy and curriculum learning objectives. 23 While this is an importantevaluation tool in assessing the quality of instruction against course objectives, limitations ofspace and data available to the author, does not allow for this type of comparison. In place of thislimitation, empirical data on the hours and methodologies of instruction, and numbers and mix(military and civilian) of instructors are defined and used for comparison.2423Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01D, Officer ProfessionalMilitary Education Policy (OPMEP), defines “levels of learning achievement” as learning in the cognitiveand affective domains.24Limitations in information found by the author of recent modifications within the CGSOCinstruction confine the recommendations presented in the final section to data available prior to 2010.Additionally, while instructor data on the total number of Ph.Ds, Joint Quality Officers, and Senior LevelCollege graduates is reported to the Joint Staff annually, there are no easily accessible da

The transition to ILE is the school’s most recent and perhaps the most dramatic change in the history of education for the Army officer corps. The concept of ILE is to provide every mid-grade officer with a common core of operational instruction, and then provide an additional,